Legislative Motivation and
Fundamental Rights in
Constitutional Law

J. MORRIS CLARK*

Professor Clark argues that when courts decide whether a given
law or regulation is unconstitutional, they should examine-as
they sometimes do-the legislative or administrative motivation
behind enactment or promulgation. The author suggests that
'purpose" and "motivation" are functionally equivalent terms
and that reference to legislative purpose (or motivation) should
be central not only to equal protection analysis, but also to the
analysis of 'fundamental rights" such asfreedom of speech or of
travel. The article concludes by discussing how certain laws may
be upheld despite an invidious purpose or motivation.
This article discusses the relevance of legislative motivation to
the judicial decision whether to uphold or to strike down laws
affecting certain "fundamental" constitutional rights, such as

speech, press, and travel. Succinctly stated, the question is
whether courts' constitutional decisions ever do or should turn on

the fact that legislators voted for a given law because of impermissible goals. One might conclude, and the Supreme Court has

sometimes stated, that the legislators' state of mind is irrelevant
and that constitutionality should be determined solely by a law's
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effects. However, the Court has also stated the contrary (and in
my view correct) position that motivation is relevant to constitutionality. If motivation is relevant, further questions arise as to
when motivation should be considered and how it can be demonstrated as a matter of evidence.
This article takes the position that courts regularly do and
should consider the motivation behind the passage of laws in constitutional cases. Motivation is relevant to constitutional decisions, independently of a law's effects, because laws passed for
reasons of prejudice or animus frequently stigmatize those whom
they burden, and they create feelings that the social contract between the government and the governed has been unfairly broken. This effect occurs with respect to laws restricting first
amendment freedoms and the fundamental right to travel as well
as laws burdening minority racial and other groups.
The major argument against a motivation-based test of constitutionality is a practical one. It is usually impossible to know the
subjective motivation of legislators by direct evidence, such as
legislative history, with enough certainty to declare a law unconstitutional as a result. However, courts should and do infer legislative motivation from a law's foreseeable effects. For example,
one can infer that a law serving no apparent purpose other than
to place disproportionate burdens on black people was passed to
discriminate against black people because of animus or prejudice.
It may be argued that such an inference is unnecessary because
when a law's undesirable effects outweigh its desirable effects, a
balancing test can be used to hold it unconstitutional. However, a
balancing approach not only fails to provide predictability and
doctrinal certainty, but it also fails to articulate reasons why certain classifications should be considered "suspect" and certain
rights should be considered "fundamental" for constitutional purposes. This article suggests that these conclusions are justifiable
primarily because history demonstrates that legislatures have repeatedly treated suspect classes and fundamental rights not only
arbitrarily but frequently with animus, or in a way that denies the
equal moral worth of the individuals concerned. As a result, our
collective sense of human nature leads us to approve "strict"
scrutiny of laws burdening not only minority racial groups but
also people who express unpopular political or religious views, or
people from states other than the one enacting a given law. This
suspicion of legislative bias justifies the anti-democratic intervention of the Supreme Court into the law-making process.
This article elucidates motivation theory, considering judicial
decisions involving "fundamental" rights under the first amend-
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ment and the rights of travel and of privacy. In addition, the first
part of this article discusses motivation theory in the contexts of
equal protection and administrative actions. No consensus exists
on the Court or in the community of legal scholars about the
meaning and the usage of the term "legislative motivation," and
much of the analysis of this term has involved race and equal protection. Also, because a number of leading cases are concerned
with administrative rather than legislative motivation, the first
part of this article touches on motivation as it applies to administrative action.
THE MEANING OF LEGISLATIVE "MOTIVATION" AND "PURPOSE"

Various explanations of the role of legislative motivation in constitutional adjudication have been advanced, but none appears to
have swept the field-a fact which doubtless explains this Colloquium in the San Diego Law Review. In recent years, the leading
academic writers on the subject have been Professors John Ely,'
Paul Brest, and Theodore Eisenberg.3 1 discuss their views at the
end of this article, comparing them with my own. In addition, the
Supreme Court recently has elaborated its view of legislative motivation in

Washington v. Davis4 and in

Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 5 I partially
developed my own views on legislative motivation in an article on
a more specific topic two years ago, 6 and I have summarized and
elaborated that material in the following discussion.
This section of the article deals at some length with the meaning of legislative motivation and purpose because I give a broader
meaning and role to "motivation" than does either the Supreme
Court or the other academic writers on the subject.7 In brief, I
view legislative motivation and purpose as functionally synony1. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
2. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95 [hereinafter cited as An Approach].
3. Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977).
4. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
5. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
6. Clark, Civil and CriminalPenalties and Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 439-54 (1976).
7. Professor Brest's views of motivation may, however, be broader and closer
to mine than his initial article, An Approach, note 2 supra, would indicate. See
text accompanying notes 243-57 infra.

mous, both referring to the goals causing legislators to vote for a
given law. In most cases, where this motivation involves prejudice
or animus, I conclude that the law is unconstitutional unless it
serves a clearly compelling state interest or does not involve affirmative state action in certain areas.
The Supreme Court on occasion has distinguished motivation
from purpose without ever satisfactorily explaining the difference. 8 As I view the Court's usage, it has related not to a difference in functional meaning but only to a difference in the ability
to prove motivation.9 Where the lawmaker's goals have been adequately known, the Court has referred to them as "purpose."
Where they have not been adequately known, the Court has declined to rely on them. It has instead labeled lawmakers' goals
"motivation."
Academic critics also use "motivation" differently from the way
I use the term. I examine these theories more fully at the end of
this article.' 0 In general, my concerns differ somewhat from the
concerns of these authors primarily because I use the term more
broadly, referring not only to possibly invidious intentions behind
apparently "good" laws but also to intentions defining the substantive limits of constitutional doctrine. A great many questions
of substantive constitutional doctrine, including the question
whether compelling state interests sufficiently vindicate a given
classification or burden, involve a determination of the lawmaker's motivation. The likelihood of illicit motivation causes the
Court not only to scrutinize strictly certain classifications or other
laws but also influences the extent to which a given state interest
is deemed compelling.
Motivation and Purpose
Because the Supreme Court frequently states that it will consider legislative purpose but not legislative motivation in determining the constitutionality of a law, I compare and contrast
these two usages at the outset. Webster's New International
8. For example, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), where a city had
closed its swimming pools to avoid their racial integration, the Court took pains to
show that legislative or administrative "motivation" was not a proper ground for
holding a law or its application unconstitutional. Later, in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), the Court stated that Palmer did not deny that plaintiffs must
show an invidious "purpose" in order for the Court to hold a law unconstitutional,
and it stated that Palmer had held only that "the legitimate purposes of the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were not open to impeachment by
evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations."
Id. at 243.
9. See text accompanying notes 47-65 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 226-74 infra.
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Dictionary defines "motive" as "something within a person...
that incites him to action" or as a "consideration or object influencing a choice or promoting an action."1 Webster's defines "purpose" as "something that one sets before himself as an object to
be attained" or "an object, effect, or result aimed at, intended or
1
attained. 2
Upon examining these definitions, it appears that all motives
are also purposes: That which "incites [an individual] to action"
presumably is always that which is "aimed at, intended or attained." Arguably, however, the converse is not true: An individual may not be motivated to attain an immediate goal for its own
sake; he may be motivated to attain it as a means to an ultimate
end.13 Someone thus might be said to have the purpose of wading
a stream because he has the motivation of getting to the other
side-even though wading was both foreseeable and intended.
The problem with this means-end distinction is that most intended results can be described as either means (by reference to
more general ends) or as ends (by reference to more specific
means).14 For example, a town councilperson's motivation for voting for a one-acre zoning requirement can be described as passage of the law. The motivation for passing the law might be
requiring one-acre lots. The motivation for requiring one-acre lots
might be to preserve a rural environment. The motivation for this
effect, in turn, might be both to preserve a pleasant environment
for existing residents and to enhance property values. One motive
for enhancing property values could be to exclude people who are
not wealthy from the community. A motive for achieving this result might be to exclude racial minorities from the town. At the
11. WEBSTER'S NEW hITERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1475 (3d ed. unabr. 1971).

12. Id. at 1847.

13. It has been suggested that legislative "purpose" refers to the immediate
meaning or application of a given statute, whereas legislative "motivation" refers
to the general objectives justifying or explaining why a particular interpretation is
preferred. See, e.g., Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the
Friendly Critics,49 CALIF. I.REV. 104, 115-16 (1961). According to this distinction,
a town council might have the "purpose" of instituting one-acre zoning but the

"motive" of excluding poor people or people of minority ethnic backgrounds from
the town.
14. Professor Ely persuasively makes this point and attacks the distinction. Ely,

supra note 1, at 1217-21. See also Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative
Intention, 40 COLum. L. REV. 957, 972 (1940) ('The phrase, 'legislative intention',
may be taken to signify the teleological concept of legislative purpose, as well as

the more immediate concept of legislative meaning.") (emphases original).

very end of the motivation chain might be generalizations such as
preserving health, welfare, and morals.
One therefore can speak of having a purpose to do something
because of a given motivation. However, one must bear in mind
that most purposes can be described as the motivation of some
other, more specific action, and most motivations can be described as purposes which in turn have some more general motivation.15 Consequently, the distinction has only relative meaning
at best. One should also keep in mind that any given purpose can
have motivations not only in the sense of derivative results but
also in the sense of choices among alternative means. Thus, one
might ask the wader what motivates him or her to wade the
stream instead of using the bridge and be answered, "It is quicker," or "I feel playful."
Webster's definitions of motivation and purpose also might suggest that one can describe some of the derivative but merely inci15. Professor Brest has tendered what appears to be an opposite definition of
the distinction between "purpose" and "intent" (meaning apparently the same
thing as "motivation"). He suggests that purpose equates with the general nature
of the goals discussed by the legislature, whereas motivation equates with more
specific goals. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADnuDICATnON: CASES
AND MATERiALS 43 (1975). He assumes that general goals of legislation are more
likely to be commonly shared by all legislators and consequently can be deduced
from the language of the statute itself Thus, one can assume that lawmakers generally intended a statute providing one-acre zoning to contribute to the health,
safety, and welfare of the community in some way. Brest presumably would say
that such a "purpose" can be inferred from the ordinance itself. More specific
goals-such as excluding the poor or members of racial minorities from the
town-involve determination of "intent." They require one to "examine closely the
proceedings and debates that led to the provision's adoption." Id.
I agree with Professor Brest, see text accompanying notes 243-57 infra, that
courts generally label investigation into legislative proceedings and debates as investigations into "intent" or into "motive," and courts generally speak of investigating "purpose" when the statutory goals are deduced from statutory language
alone. However, it hardly seems true that more specific goals are more difficult to
identify from statutory language than are general ones. In the zoning case, the
specific goals of promoting large lot size, uncrowded housing conditions, and low
density population can be attributed to lawmakers with little hesitation. The derivative and more general goals-excluding people who cannot afford such amenities,
and still more derivatively, ethnic groups who are not likely to be sufficiently
wealthy to buy in-are more dubious. Unless Brest uses "specific" and "less specific" in a different way from the way I use them, I disagree with his generalization that "intent" can be associated with "specific" goals and "purpose" with "less
specific" goals.
It also should be indicated that the criminal law uses purpose and motive in an
opposite sense, using "purpose" to denote the intention to commit a criminal act,
and "motive" to denote the more general, derivative goals to be served therebyfor example, avenging a grudge or escaping from prison. This usage demonstrates
that a distinction can be made between specific and less specific, or between immediate and derivative, effects. Indeed, the distinction is useful in the criminal
law, but I do not think that it is at all relevant for purposes of legislative interpretation.
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dental effects resulting from pursuing a given motivation as
purposes (but not as motivations). Thus, if the hypothetical
wader's motive is simply to get to the other side of the stream,
one could still say that he or she purposefully gets wet in the
sense that getting wet is a knowing, foreseen consequence a person intentionally brings about. One also might say that the town
council purposefully makes it impossible for the town to include
poor people or to achieve a racial balance. In this sense, "purposefully" means intentionally.
Nonetheless, when one discusses the purpose of a given action,
or even a purpose, he or she usually equates purpose with motivation and does not use the term to include merely incidental
(though foreseeable) effects following from achieving this purpose.' 6 Thus, it would be abnormal to say that the hypothetical
wader has the purpose of getting wet when he or she crosses the
stream unless this effect actually is one of the things that motivates him or her. Similarly, if a town councilperson foresees that
one-acre zoning would exclude racial minorities from the town
but sincerely eschews that result as a desirable end-or motive, it
would not fit common usage to say that one of the councilperson's
purposes in voting for the law is to bring about racial segregation.
One might describe the purpose as preserving rural environments
or high property values at the cost of creating a mostly caucasian
community, but one nonetheless tends to use '"purpose" to mean
"causative" purpose-that is, to mean "motivation." A question
whether the councilperson's purpose is to create a caucasian community would probably produce at most the clarification, "No,
what I am really trying to do is to produce a rural-seeming community."
It should be pointed out that a person can have more than one
purpose or motivation. However, this fact does not affect the basic
17
equation of motivation with purpose.
16. The Supreme Court confirms this view of usage in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406

U.S. 535, 543 n.l (1972), when it states that a foreseeable effect of a statute was
nonetheless not one of the "two broad purposes" of Congress in enacting the law.
Here the Court apparently uses "purpose" in the sense of "dominant" or "causa-

tive" purpose, or in other words, to mean "motive."

Likewise, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977), the Court states that racial discrimination will be found
where "a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor" in a deci-

sion-again equating purpose with motivation.

17. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265-68 (1977).

Another distinction between the terms motivation and purpose
lies in the fact that one commonly speaks, perhaps loosely, of objects or things as having purposes but not motivations.l8 When referring to the purpose of an object, one generally refers in fact to
the purpose or to the motivation of some person who either wants
it or will use it. Sometimes one thinks of an object's purpose as
congruent with the purpose or with the motivation of its maker,
as when one says that the purpose of an airplane is transportation, or that the purpose of a given novel is to entertain or to instruct. It is also common to speak of the purpose of an object in
the context of its being put to use by someone other than its
maker. Thus, nuclear energy can serve either peaceful or military
purposes. So it is with laws. A law defining obscenity and authorizing its enforcement by a board of censors may be enacted by
city fathers who intend and foresee that it will be used to suppress only material meeting the constitutional definition of obscenity. However, without the provision of adequate due process
safeguards, such a law may in fact "serve the purpose" of the
board of censors by censoring any material the board deems in
bad taste. Similarly, a law requiring the registration of political
dissidents may "serve the purpose" of private persons desiring to
harass or to discriminate against such people.
To sum up this discussion, both common and judicial uses of
the term "legislative motivation" usually refer to a goal causing
legislators to vote for a statute. Alternatively, "motivation" de18. In connection with the notion that legislation has its own purpose, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.
That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is

evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to be led off the trail by tests that have overtones
of subjective design. We are not concerned with anything subjective.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLum. L. REV.527,
538-39 (1947).

Professor Brest criticizes a literal reading of Frankfurter's passage:
Things-including statutes and constitutional provisions-do not have
"hpurposes" or "aims;" they do not "seek to obviate" mischiefs. These
terms
animate
...
[T]he
purpose
of a provision
,
seems require
,ultimately
to refersubjects.
to the purposes,
aims,
or seekings--in
short the
"intent"-ofthose who framed and adopted the provision.... The concept ofpurpose incorporates an element of wilL It would simply be a misuse of language to say that a thing's purpose is anything it does or can do,
apart from human intention. For example, it is not a purpose of an automobile to pollute, maim, or k and, only by using a figurative anthropo.
morphism, is it an automobile s purpose to transport passengers.

P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrTUToNAL ADJUICATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 42
(1975). I agree with Professor Brest, although I assert that the attribution of pur-

pose to a law often refers in fact to the purpose of its enforcer or of its administrator as well as that of its enactor.
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scribes the results the legislators hoped to achieve or to avoid by
using one means rather than another to reach this goal.
Common and judicial use of the term "legislative purpose" is
generally the same as the use of "legislative motivation." Purpose
generally refers to causative purpose--that is, motivation. Thus,
one can enquire interchangeably of either the legislature's purposes or motivations in passing a given law or its purposes or
motivations in using a particular means to the end thus identified.
It is possible to distinguish purpose from motivation by using the
former term to denote means and the latter term to denote ends.
However, because nearly any goal can be described as a means to
some end, or as an end to another instrumental means, the distinction is only relative. Defining purpose to include incidental effects not motivating the legislators but following from their
primary goal-for example, caucasian communities resulting from
one-acre zoning motivated by aesthetics-is an unusual differentiation between purpose and motivation.
When one refers to a law's purpose, one generally refers to the
purpose or the motivation (again, using these terms interchangeably) of the legislators passing it. However, it is also possible to
speak of the purpose a given law "can serve" at the behest of law
enforcers or other parties taking advantage of the law's effects.
When one speaks of a law's purpose in this way, one usually refers interchangeably to the motivation or purpose of the people
who will make use of the law.
Thus far I have asserted that legislative motivation and legislative purpose have functionally identical conceptual referents.
What, then, does the Supreme Court mean when it distinguishes
these two terms by saying that it is improper for courts to inquire
into legislative "motivation" to determine a law's constitutionality? By contrast, courts regularly refer to the propriety or impropriety of legislative "purpose" in such contexts. 19
In my opinion this distinction is misleading, for it arises not
from a difference in the referents of the two terms but from a difference in the Court's ability to establish the referents by reliable
evidence. 2 0 When the Court decries reference to "motivation" as a
19. See note 8 supra.
20. Writers elsewhere have posited a similar distinction by suggesting that leg-

islative "motivation" refers to the reasons individual legislators vote for a given

law, whereas "purpose" refers to the goals, determined by objective means, that
the legislature as a body seeks to achieve. See A. BIcKEI, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

reason for holding a law unconstitutional, it generally does so in a
situation where evidence of the causative legislative goals is too
uncertain to warrant holding the motivation or the purpose to be
invidious. On the one hand, this evidence frequently consists of
legislative history on which the Court generally declines to rely in
constitutional cases. 21 Sometimes this evidence consists of circumstantial facts leaving the true purpose of the legislature to
speculation. 22 On the other hand, when the Court holds a given
legislative "purpose" to be unconstitutional, it does so on the basis of evidence it considers reliable, usually based on the effects
of the law. These effects frequently include burdening or stigmatizing a traditionally unpopular group. Furthermore, the law frequently serves no particularly good purpose or serves good
purposes in ways that unnecessarily impose the burden or stigma
in question.P
This article later examines at greater length reasons the Court
considers some kinds of legislative motive/purpose evidence reliable and other kinds of such evidence unreliable. At this point, it
is sufficient to state that the Court's distinction does not delineate
any real difference in meaning between motivation and purpose;
rather, the Court's distinction signals a conclusion concerning the

BRANcH 209-10 (1962); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 Hitv.
L REV. 1065, 1091-92 (1969), 1 would say that "motivation" and "purpose" both refer
to the goals of the individual legislators passing the law and that these goals are
relevant insofar as there exists a consensus or near-consensus among the legislators about their goals. The difference between motivation and purpose in terms of
their meaning is therefore nonexistent, the difference is that the Court uses "motivation" to denote goals which it cannot identify with enough certainty to act on
and "purpose" to denote goals which it can so identify.
21. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 617-19 (1960). But see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14
(1946) (citing legislative history indicating goal of purging government of sub.
versives and referring to these goals as the "purpose" of the bill's sponsors).
22. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 326 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cf Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (requiring proof
of a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose").
23. As I suggest below, invidious purpose generally is presumed in cases where
a traditionally disfavored class (such as black people) or a traditionally vulnerable
activity (such as political speech) is burdened. See generally Note, Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1076-87 (1969). However, the
Court also has made clear that on appropriate occasions it will find improper purpose based on the legislative history and specific events surrounding the enactment of a particular law. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), the Court suggests that evidence "whether
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" may include "a clear
pattern" of state action, "[t]he historical background of the decision," "[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," "[tJ he legislative
or administrative history," and occasionally even testimony of members of the
decisionmaking body.
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propriety of the Court's condemning, on the evidence before it,
the legislature's motivation or purpose.
THE MEANING OF "INVIDIOUS" LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OR

MOTIVATION

The following section discusses of what an "invidious" legislative motivation consists; why legislative motivation, as opposed to
statutory effects, is important to constitutional adjudication; and
how the Court does and should decide when such a motivation
exists.
As a matter of common intuition, it seems clear that society
cares about lawmakers' subjective states of mind. As Justice
Holmes stated, even a dog knows the difference between being
kicked and being stumbled over.2 4 Similarly, anyone would sense
a sharp difference between being shoved in anger and being
shoved from the path of an oncoming truck. As I have argued
before, 25 quite apart from whether the shove is necessary for
safety, people react to the sincerity or to the mental state of shovers. Upon sensing an animus behind the action, people may become ambivalent in attitude, attempting to determine what the
shover "really meant." One's reaction will be either gratitude or
anger, depending on whether one concludes that the other intended to help or to manipulate and to hurt.
People instinctively react in much the same way to actions by
government officials. If a city council grants a construction contract to a company other than the lowest bidder because the company's president is a councilperson's relative, or for that matter
denies the contract to the lowest bidder because that company's
president is a council member's personal enemy, all would agree
that something unfair has happened that transcends any dollar
cost to the city. For similar reasons, people deplore conflicts of interests in legislators or in judges, even though the laws they vote
for or the judgments they render by reason of the conflict are not
markedly detrimental to the public. Likewise, a jury selection
process that purposefully, as opposed to accidentally, produces a
lily-white jury creates a sense of discriminatory unfairness that
24. 0. Holmms, TuE CoMMON LAw 7 (M. Howe ed. 1963). Professor Brest makes
a similar observation in Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,27 STAN. L. Rlv. 585, 590 (1975).
25. Clark, Civil and Criminal Penaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MIm. L. REv. 379, 437-38 (1976).

does not derive from the effect of the action alone, but rather
from its purpose.
Similarly, people care about the intentions of legislators. People-and the Supreme Court as well-commonly speak of laws'
purposes and not merely of their effects. This concern for purpose
or motivation appears most clearly in equal protection cases.
Tussman and tenBroek have statedIt is indeed difficult to see that anything else is involved in these discriminatory legislative cases than questions of motivation. Hostility, antagonism, prejudice-these surely can be predicated not of laws but of
men; they are attitudes, states of mind, feelings, and they are qualities of
law-makers, not of laws.
Viewed in this light the prohibition against discriminatory legislation is
a demand for purity of motive. It erects a constitutional barrier against
legislative motives of hate, prejudice, vengeance, hostility, or, alternatively, of favoritism, and partiality. The imposition of special burdens, the
granting of special benefits, must always be justified. They can only be
justified as being directed at the elimination of some social evil, the
achievement of some public good. When and if the proscribed motives replace a concern for the public good as the 'purpose" of the law, there is a
violation
of the equal protection prohibition against discriminatory legisla26
tion.

Laws enacted because of "impure" motive or prejudice have
two undesirable effects: They stigmatize the victim, and they create a sense of breach of faith between the governor and the governed. A law segregating the races, even without imposing
disproportionate burdens on the minority race-for example, a
law segregating bathrooms or bathing beaches of equal quality-usually conveys the message that the people who enacted the
law believe that members of other races are inferior or at least
distasteful. 27 Hostility is an inevitable part of this message, and
when the lawmakers belong to the numerically and economically
dominant race in the society-as is generally the case-a message
of stigma or of social inferiority is also conveyed.28 Whether the
26. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 358 (1949).
27. See Pollak, Racial Discriminationand JudicialIntegrity:A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
28. For detailed studies on the stigmatic effects of prejudice on minority group
children, the effects of which induce a low self-image, see K. CLARic, PREMJDICE
AN

YoUR

CHILD

(1973); T. PET'I7GREW, A

PROFILmE OF THE NEGRO AMERUCAN

(1964).

See generally Wasserstrom, Racism; Sexism; and Preferential Treatment: An Approachto the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 581 (1977), wherein the author states:
In our culture to be nonwhite-and especially to be black-is to be treated
and seen to be a member of a group that is different from and inferior to
the group of standard, fully developed persons, the adult white males. To
be black is to be a member of what was a despised minority and what is
still a disliked and oppressed one.
Id. at 586. See also id. at 586 n.1l. See Brest, The Supreme Cour4 1975
Term-Foreword:In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HAv.L. REV.
1, 8 (1976); Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship

964
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victim associates this hostility 'and this stigma with the people
making the law, with the policemen enforcing it, or with white society at large makes little practical difference. If the law cannot be
justified in terms of social necessity, avoiding the inference that

those responsible for the law have acted from beliefs of racial inferiority or from hostility, the stigma is likely to be attributed by
those it affects to the law and to all those responsible for its passage and enforcement.
Laws implying hostility are not the only laws creating a perception that the moral worth of individuals has been discounted. Sex
discrimination illustrates another kind of discounting: a view, frequently, that women deserve protection in a paternalistic way because they are insufficiently capable, forceful, intelligent, or
educated to engage in the same kinds of work or to accept the
same kinds of responsibility as men.2 9 Invidious motivation thus
does not necessarily portend a malicious or even a conscious discounting of the individual.30 Doubtless many legislators who have
passed sexually discriminatory laws that have since been held
unconstitutional sincerely believed that they were doing the best
thing possible for women. Some legislators who have voted for racially discriminatory laws probably possessed similar beliefs.
However, considering a lawmaker's perception of another individual's low worth or stature honest but mistaken does not make
that perception any less stigmatic, less infuriating, or less violative of the governor's obligation under the democratic social conUnder the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6-7 nn.28-31 (1977). Brest
states that "[d]ecisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective in-

difference inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior.
Moreover, because acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their

victims suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries." Brest,

supra.
29. See Wasserstrom, Racism; Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.LA. L. REV. 581, 587-91 (1977).

30. Brest states that unselfconsciously discriminatory acts nonetheless "are unfair. They are also stigmatic, for to show less empathy for people because of their

race is to treat them as less human because of their race." Brest, supra note 28, at
14. Some psychoanalytic theory suggests, however, that prejudice is generally a
learned, aggressive reaction to frustration and that prejudice therefore generally
does contain an element of hostility-whether conscious or unconscious. See
Klineberg, Prejudice:The Concept, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 439, 440-41 (D. Sills ed. 1968). Indeed, to the extent that prejudice
consists of a persistent pattern of arbitrary behavior and of the devaluation of the

individual, it is difficult to see how, apart from animus of some kind, such an obdurate attitude could originate or perpetuate itself. Klineberg suggests that the answer, if any, can be found in learned behavior and in tradition.

tract to consider equally the needs, capabilities, and moral worth
of all the governed. 3' Professor Brest articulates this point in his
1976 Supreme Court Foreword:
[A]lthough a court often cannot ascertain the true motives underlying a
decision, our history and traditions provide strong reasons to suspect that
racial classifications ultimately rest on assumptions of the differential
worth of racial groups. These racial value judgments appear in forms besides "racial antagonism"-for example in paternalistic assumptions of racial inferiority.
By the phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference I
mean the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition
of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of
course to one's own group. Although racially selective sympathy and indifference (hereafter, just indifference) is an inevitable consequence of attributing intrinsic value to membership in a racial group, it may also
result from a desire to enhance our own power and esteem by enhancing
the power and esteem of members of groups to which we belong. And it
may also result-often unconsciously-from our tendency to sympathize
most readily with those who seem most like ourselves. Whatever its
cause, decisions that reflect this phenomenon, like those reflecting overt
racial hostility, are unfair for by hypothesis, they are decisions disadvantaging minority persons that would not be made under the identical
circumstances if they disadvantaged members of the dominant group. The
unequal treatment could be justified only if one group were in fact more
worthy than the other. This justification failing,
such treatment violates
32
the cardinal rule of fairness-the Golden Rule.

As Professor Karst indicates, the devaluation resulting from
stigmatizing a given group in society also serves to justify future
deprivations of goods or benefits, so that "stigma's victims tend to
lose not only self-respect, but other goods as well." 33 In general
terms, therefore, I submit that invidious motivation or invidious
purpose consists of devaluing the needs, wants, capabilities, or
31. For a concise but thorough analysis of social science research bearing on
prejudiced attitudes and behavior, including an analysis of their causes and remedies, see J. JONEs, PREJUDIcE AND RAcISM 60-113 (1972).
Brest argues that:
Racial generalizations usually inflict psychic injury whether or not they
are in fact premised on assumptions of differential moral worth. Although
all of us recognize that institutional decisions must depend on generalizations based on objective characteristics of persons and things rather than
on individualized judgments, we nonetheless tend to feel unfairly treated
when disadvantaged by a generalization that is not true as applied to us.
Generalizations based on immutable personal traits such as race or sex
are especially frustrating because we can do nothing to escape their operation. These generalizations are still more pernicious, for they are often
premised on the supposed correlation between the inherited characteristic and the undesirable voluntary behavior of those who possess the characteristic-for example, blacks are less industrious, trustworthy, or clean
than whites. Because the behavior is voluntary, and hence the proper object for moral condemnation, individuals as to whom the generalization is
inaccurate may justifiably feel that the decisionmaker has passed moral
judgment on them.
Brest, supra note 28, at 10.
32. Brest, supra note 28, at 7-8.
33. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under
the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv. L REV. 1, 7 (1977).
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dignity of members of a group, whether for reasons of hostility or
of other prejudice, on the unwarranted assumption that such
group members are less capable or less worthy of consideration
than other members of society.34 Moreover, the resulting sense of
stigma is the product of the victim's perception of the lawmaker's
or law enforcer's state of mind.
A second major reason exists for concern that a law is motivated by prejudice. A law communicating an evaluation in the
sense just described also does something further. It creates a
profound sense of injustice in society.3 5 The theory of democracy,
that each person is of equal moral worth, demands that
lawmakers represent all members of society and that the legitimate needs of each member be fairly considered. The extent to
which this theory has ever been totally honored is doubtless open
to debate; but whenever lawmakers have repeatedly discounted
the moral worth of certain members of society-whenever
lawmakers have treated these individuals with hostility-the
lawmakers have breached the social contract which ultimately
gives them power. The resulting sense of unfairness necessarily
has bred a deep cynicism about the very legitimacy of government itself.
These observations should not be taken to imply that all stigmatizing laws break the social contract and are unconstitutional,
or that only such laws are unconstitutional. Rather, certain laws
communicating a sense of animus, hostility, and intentional stigmatization on the part of lawmakers also create a sense of unfairness and breach of faith between the governor and the governed.
These perceptions seem to be clearly relevant considerations in
constitutional adjudication. At a later point in this article, I discuss at greater length when the Court should intervene and de34. Cf.Yinger, Prejudice: Social Discrimination,in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 448, 449 (D. Sills ed. 1968) (alternative definition):
Prejudice can be defined as an inner tendency to respond to persons on
the basis of their group membership; it is a rigid, emotional prejudgment
that gives an individual confidence that he knows all about a person when
he knows his membership in a symbolically important group. This tendency may or may not express itself in discriminatory behavior on the
part of a person....
35. I assume that Professor Brest has some similar idea in mind when he states
that treating a given group in a prejudicial way "violates the cardinal rule of fairness--the Golden Rule." Brest, supra note 28, at 8. Brest characterizes such treatment as embodying a "defect of process" as opposed to the harm caused to the

victim by stigma. Id., at 6.

clare laws to be unconstitutional on the basis of invidious purpose
or motivation.
Professor Karst makes a point I take to be similar to the above
position. Although he does not write explicitly about invidious
legislative motivation, it seems clear that he is concerned with exactly this problem when he discusses the demands of his "principle of equal citizenship":
The principle of equal citizenship presumptively insists that the organized society treat each individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who "belongs." Stated negatively, the principle presumptively

forbids the organized society to treat an individual either as a member of
an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant. Accordingly, the
principle guards against degradation or the imposition of stigma. The inverse relationship between stigma and recognition as a person is evident.
"By definition, ... we believe that the person with a stigma is not quite

human." The relationship between stigma and inequality is also clear.
while not all inequalities stigmatize, the essence of any stigma lies in the
fact that the affected individual is regarded as an unequal in some respect. A society devoted to the idea of equal citizenship, then, will repudiand thus "belie the
ate those inequalities that impose the stigma of caste
36
principle that people are of equal ultimate worth."

The state of legislators' minds is relevant in certain cases,
therefore, because laws motivated by prejudice produce feelings
of anger, devaluation, and breach of the social contract demanding fair representation. Because these concerns are intuitively important, they are reflected in the way laws are discussed.
Journalists constantly examine the purity of motive of legislators
who are suspected of graft or other conflicts of interest. Politicians at election time accuse each other of trying to hurt, or of not
caring about, certain electoral interests. Minority political groups,
because of laws they dislike, frequently accuse the legislature of
"fascist plots" or "communist conspiracies." These accusations
mirror both a tendency to impute evil motives to those with
whom one strongly disagrees and perhaps an instinct for the rhetorical power of such language with regard to listeners.
If these concerns about legislative motivation are real and reflect the way people think and feel about law, it would be strange
indeed to assert that such concerns disappear in court when a
judge is asked to determine the constitutional validity of a given
law. Such an assertion is all the more difficult because judges
have generally spent lifetimes with the law before ascending to
the bench. They know from experience that motivations range
from good to bad. When they see a particular law and learn its
36. Karst, The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) (quoting E. GOFFmN,
SnGMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963); R. RODES, THE

LEGAL ENTERPRMSE 163 (1976)).
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background, their experience gives them a better than average instinct, or perception, as to whether the legislative motivation was
good or bad.
All this adds up to a strong real-world desire to consider motivation in judging the constitutional validity of laws. The dominant
question is not whether motivation is relevant to such determinations, but how motivation can be properly attributed, given the
difficulty of knowing what legislators are thinking when they enact a law. Not surprisingly, the Court has approached this problem by identifying types of legislation most likely to result from
prejudice and has concentrated its investigation of purpose on
these cases.
For the most part, the courts have permitted both state legislatures and Congress to serve as judges of the fundamental fairness
of laws. Laws placing highly arbitrary and disproportionate burdens on one economic group, for example, have been subjected to
the most minimal level of review by the Supreme Court since the
demise of the economic substantive due process doctrine in
1937.a3 The same has been true of judicial review, under the tenth
amendment, of federal laws encroaching on states' police power
to regulate private individuals' conduct. 38 This minimalist approach contrasts sharply with the Court's activist intervention in
reviewing state and federal laws affecting individual rights. The
factor best justifying the Court's anti-democratic intervention in
overturning laws passed by the democratic majority is that laws
burdening racial minorities or other historically unpopular groups
under the equal protection clause, or burdening communists, religious minorities, or other traditionally unpopular groups under
the first amendment, or burdening out-of-staters under the commerce clause, are precisely the kind of laws that are most likely to
have resulted from animus, of prejudice, or the arbitrary discounting of individuals or of groups. Significantly, it is also these
same groups that, by reason of repeated acts of discrimination,
feel the effects most sharply.
It is wise for the Supreme Court to intervene in cases such as
these. That the above-mentioned groups have historically been
37. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court"An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
38. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

discriminated against sharply increases the likelihood that the
legislature or Congress actually did break the social contract by
acting through animus or prejudice. 39 Such legislative acts not
only reach socially undesirable results, but they also threaten the
very legitimacy of government. Supreme Court intervention invalidates laws reasonably appearing to have been enacted because of improper animus or prejudice. The Court additionally
can create rules inhibiting future legislatures from enacting laws
for similarly invidious reasons.
Professor Fiss has articulated at length this same idea-that
equal protection law, at least, should be sensitive to laws burdening or stigmatizing groups but not individuals. 40 Fiss characterizes
the key factor in such group-related discrimination as "status
harm" rather than invidious motivation. However, the harms Fiss
identifies and the reasons for judicial intervention growing out of
them are generally similar to the motivational concerns with
which this article deals. 4 1 As Fiss states, "[t]he concern should be
with those laws or practices that particularly hurt a disadvantaged group .... [W] hat is critical... is that the state law or
practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of
a specially disadvantaged group. This is what the Equal Protection Clause prohibits."42
To assert the general significance of prejudice to legislation and
the relative likelihood that certain kinds of legislation are prejudicially motivated is, of course, a good deal easier than to define or
to identify when prejudice motivates given legislation. Absent the
ability to know the hearts of legislators, such judgments necessarily involve a degree of indeterminacy. However, it is possible to
sketch at least the elements of the inquiry.
First is the question of whose perception of discounting or of
prejudice is relevant. In the above description of the harmful effects of prejudice, it should be observed that its appearance is
nearly as important as its reality. On the one hand, because no
39. Thus, Brest states that "[tihis so-called 'strict scrutiny' or 'suspect classification' standard serves as a proxy for a direct (and problematic) inquiry into the
integrity of the decisionmaking process: as the legitimate reasons for race-dependent decisions increase, so does the likelihood that they were not made for iUegitimate reasons." Brest, supra note 28, at 15.
40. Fiss, Groupsand the EqualProtection Clause, 5 PmL. & PUB. AM. 107 (1976).

41. Fiss suggests that blacks serve as a paradigm for the kinds of classes that
should be afforded special judicial protection under the equal protection clause in
that "(a) they are a social group; (b) the group has'been in a position of perpetual
subordination; and (c) the political power of the group is severely circumscribed.
Blacks are what might be called a specially disadvantaged group, and I would view
the Equal Protection Clause as a protection for such groups." Id. at 154-55. Fiss
also suggests a motivational basis for his theory. See id. at 140.
42. Id. at 157.
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one but the individual lawmakers can know their motivation with
total certainty, even greater reason exists to rely on the appearance in its place. On the other hand, the simple fact that a given
group believes that the legislature has discounted its needs and
its worth cannot alone serve to invalidate the law, for most laws
are likely to be so perceived by some group adversely affected.
Consequently, the Court must serve as the arbiter of whether a
given law reasonably appears to have been motivated by
prejudice, knowing in many cases that no simple, "true" answer
to this question exists apart from the Court's own conclusion.
A second problem is the need to define what facts should give
rise to a finding that prejudice has motivated legislation. In my
view, there are two major elements to this inquiry. First, the individual or individuals affected must possess traits characterizing a
group that has traditionally been considered inferior in our society. Second, the law arbitrarily must single out or must burden
people possessing these traits, or at least be insufficiently justified to dispel the sense that the law was passed out of animus or
without recognition of the group's legitimate needs.
Turning to the first of these elements, the necessity of finding
the group in question to be traditionally unpopular should be
highlighted.4 3 On the one hand, legislatures pass many laws drawing relatively arbitrary lines between individuals in different professional categories or in different income levels. However, we do
not consider these distinctions to be motivated by prejudice simply because such groups generally are not unpopular in our society, and given individuals are not burdened repeatedly by reason
43. The stigmatic effects of prejudice are generally said to correlate with their
repetitive nature. Yinger states thatWhen the drawing of "an unfair or injurious distinction" has become a
matter of scattered, individual acts unsupported by group memberships
and standards, it loses a number of the important qualities of social discrimination: random individual acts of discrimination tend to scatter
throughout the population; they do not pile up on particular groups, creating sell-perpetuating justifications from the responses of those continually
discriminated against.
Yinger, Prejudice:Social Discrimination,in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SocIAL SCIENCES 448, 449 (D. Sills ed. 1968). I argue below that prejudiced motivation is a danger against which the first amendment as well as the equal protection clause guards. It perhaps could be argued that it is somewhat less likely
that political speakers will be subjected to repeated acts of prejudice throughout
their lives than will members of racial minorities. Nonetheless, the lengthy history
of political and religious persecution in Western societies suggests that unchecked
prejudice may be as intense and as repetitive as racial persecution, if not more so.

of membership in such groups. 4 4 On the other hand, prejudice is a
great deal more likely to be perceived by most of us when burdens are placed on groups traditionally deemed immoral, dangerous, or incompetent. A variety of groups have served as pariahs to
a large number of people in our history. Black people, orientals,
people of minority religious views, communists, hippies, draft resisters and evaders, recent immigrants, common criminals, gay
people, out-of-power politicians and political parties, and people
with mental disabilities are all groups that at one time or another
have been ostracized and judged morally inferior. Women have
been discounted in a different fashion. Similarly, state legislators
frequently have passed laws placing disproportionate burdens on
out-of-staters because they are easier to burden politically than
the legislators' own constituents. All these groups can be said to
suffer from prejudice in the sense that they have been considered
either more immoral, untrustworthy, antisocial, dangerous, or incompetent than other groups in the population, or in some other
way less worthy of political consideration (as in the case of outof-state residents).
However, not all hostilities or judgments of incompetence are
arbitrary. No one could be accused of prejudice for inveighing
against granting human civil rights to man-eating tigers or for arguing in favor of putting murderers in jail. The justification (or
lack thereof) for discounting an individual's moral worth makes a
significant difference in perception of the motivation of the person making the judgment-in this case, the lawmaker. 45 For example, a law requiring racial segregation in prisons conveys an
entirely different sense of the administration's attitude toward
prisoners, depending on whether the segregation is demonstrably
necessary to prevent inmate violence.4 6 If the segregation is unnecessary, the law could convey a sense of hostility by white administrators toward black prisoners. If the segregation is
necessary, the law could convey a sense of proper administrative
concern for the safety of black (and/or white) prisoners. In other
words, some judgments discounting an individual's worth or his
ability would be considered fair by most people in this society because the individual has done something or possesses traits that
most people would agree make the judgment rational. Other judgments would not be considered fair on this basis. Some criminals
are statistically likely to recidivate, some mentally handicapped
44. Cf. Fiss, supra note 40, at 156 (arguing that economic classifications gener-

ally should not violate the equal protection clause simply because they do not affect "groups").

45. See note 39 supra.
46. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
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people are likely to perform given jobs incompetently, and people
from some ethnic backgrounds statistically might evince lower
reading and writing skills than people from other ethnic backgrounds. At what point these tendencies become statistically predictable for the group, and at what point it becomes "fair" to
prejudge and then to burden a given member of the group by statistical predictions based on the group as a whole-rather than on
evidence of the individual's own character and ability-are frequently difficult questions. The answers sometimes depend on
the difficulty of measuring the individual's own ability and making predictions on that basis. The moral capacity to refrain from
crime is difficult to measure. The ability to read and write is not.
I do not intend at this point to suggest any general rules determining when judgments about groups are "prejudiced" and
when
they are not, or even to form an opinion whether any such general
rules are possible. I merely intend to note that a necessary part of
the Court's job is to make such judgments.
In general, I think that the Court goes about determining
whether laws have a valid or an invalid purpose by examining the
questions I have just outlined: whether the law affects a traditionally vulnerable group or right, and if so, whether the law is justifiable. The next section deals with the reasons the Court uses this
approach instead of relying on legislative history. The next section also addresses the question how a judgment about purpose
inferred from effects differs from a simple balancing test which
weighs the interests affected and determines their relative value.
At a subsequent point in the article, I demonstrate why the perception of legislative prejudice or animus in enacting given laws
is relevant not only to decisions applying the equal protection
clause but also to those applying the first amendment and the
various clauses protecting the right to travel. Although the need
to protect against legislative bias is a concern in many of the
Court's constitutionally appropriate areas of decision, these particular constitutional provisions serve to illustrate the theory.
Identifying Invidious Legislative Motivation or Purpose
in ConstitutionalCases
As stated above, 47 the Supreme Court has sometimes indicated
that it will look to legislative "purpose" but not to legislative "mo47. See note 8 supra.

tivation" in determining whether a law is constitutional. In general, this distinction seems to mean that the Court disbelieves the
possibility of clearly demonstrating by direct evidence, such as
legislative history, that a majority of individual legislators intended unconstitutional goals.
The use of either legislative history or speculation to determine
motivation is commonplace where courts seek to interpret statutes not for purposes of constitutional adjudication but to decide
whether to apply the statute to a particular set of facts. In such
enterprises courts work in partnership with legislatures, seeking
to determine the ways a legislature would have wanted a statute
applied. Because there is no question of invalidating the statute,
uncertainty about the motivation or the purpose of the statute
does not lead to conflict between the courts and the political
branches of government. Even inconclusive historical evidence of
the legislative mindset, or even pure judicial speculation-as well
as considerations of policy-may serve to provide an intelligible
reason for applying a statute in a particular way. If a court arrives
at an impractical interpretation of the statute, the legislature can
correct the mistake. In any event, some interpretation of the statute must be made. A court therefore is entitled to rely on speculative evidence or even on no evidence at all.
However, when a court judges the constitutionality of a statute,
speculative judgments about improper legislative motivation generally are condemned. The constitutionality of most statutes is
presumed unless an improper purpose can be demonstrated in a
49
convincing fashion. The Supreme Court48 and commentators
have indicated why legislative history generally is inadequate to
serve as the sole basis for impeaching statutory purpose in a constitutional case. First, different legislators might have conceived
of different goals when they voted for a statute, so that no single
purpose exists for the law. Furthermore, the executive may have
had yet another motive in signing the act into law. Second, even if
a consensus among legislators existed, it might be difficult to ascertain because the views of few legislators are recorded: In many
states there is no record of the views of legislators. Third, even if
the courts strike down a law because of improper legislative motivation, presumably the judicial action cannot prevent reenactment of the same law with a "laundered" legislative history.
Fourth, the Court has declined to strike down useful laws passed
48. See cases cited note 8 supra.
49. See An Approach, supra note 2, at 119-30; Ely, supra note 1, at 1212-17;
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966). However, Professor Eisenberg takes the position that some of the objections to deciding cases on the basis
of motivation are not persuasive. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 114-17.
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for putatively bad purposes. Such action would be dysfunctional
because it would serve only to chasten legislative immorality
rather than to advance the public good. Fifth, psychological examination by courts of coordinate branches of government (or of
state government) has been said to be demeaning or disrespectful.
By contrast, courts as a regular matter do reach conclusions in
constitutional cases about the '"purpose" of statutes by inferring
such purpose from the statute's language and from its effects. 50
These conclusions, however, do not necessarily purport to describe the actual legislative motivation with which a given law
was passed. More frequently, they concern the likelihood that
such a motivation was present. In this sense, conclusions about
purpose deriving from statutory effects differ from conclusions
drawn from legislative history: The former concern probabilities;
the latter, historical fact. When a court concludes from analysis of
statutory effects that the law's purpose is unconstitutional, it really concludes that in all probability the law was improperly motivated because laws such as the one in question usually involve
bad motivation. Therefore, the court concludes that it is permissible to strike such laws.
An example illustrates this point. Under the equal protection
clause, a statute creating an explicit racial classification is presumed to have the invidious purpose of discrininating to burden
arbitrarily or punitively an unpopular minority group.5 1 This presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the statute in fact
serves good and necessary goals. The Japanese prison camp cases
of World War 11 are early (albeit dubious) examples; 52 some af53
firmative-action programs now constitute palatable examples.
However, the statute is usually stricken. Some classifications,
such as those based on race, create such a strong presumption of
invidious purpose that they can be redeemed only by demonstrating a compelling state interest. As Professor Karst has stated,
"[wihen the burden of legislation falls most heavily on a group
that is likely to be a subject of the legislature's systematic ne50. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976).
51. Id. at 241. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1174-75 (1969).
52. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
53. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted,429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811).

glect, it is natural for judicial scrutiny to be heightened."54 Other
classifications, such as sex55 and illegitimacy,56 though suspect of
arbitrariness or prejudice, have been justified more often than racial classifications by a demonstration that some legitimate state
interest is served. Still other classifications, such as those based
on economic disadvantage, are not suspect and may be justified
by a showing that almost any state interests--even highly specu57
lative ones-are served.
The process of suspicion and rebuttal by which courts determine legislative purpose does not necessarily produce certainty
about the actual motivations of the legislators who passed the
law. Indeed, the Court frequently recognizes an "uncertainty principle" when it formulates rules, saying in effect, "Because we cannot know with certainty the actual motivation of the legislature,
we will set up preventive rules that will prohibit the legislature
from passing the kinds of laws which have a probability of being
invidiously motivated." For example, because legislative investigative committees might be attempting to harass an unpopular
group rather than to pursue the valid goal of passing legislation,
the Court sometimes requires a showing of probable cause that
the investigated group has members who are acting illegally. It
also has required a valid committee authorization to pursue the
investigation for proper legislative reasons. 58
Despite the recognition of an uncertainty principle in determinations of purpose by reference to effects, this method of proceeding nonetheless avoids some of the problems of reference to
legislative history.5 9 There is no assumption that a legislative consensus can be known reliably by direct evidence. Evidence of illicit motivation serves at most to create a suspicion of improper
purpose. The suspicion can be rebutted by a showing that the leg54. Karst, The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under
the FourteenthAmendmen4 91 HARv.L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1977).
55. Compare, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding sex discrimination unconstitutional), with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974), and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding no invidious sex discrimination).
56. Compare, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), and Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (allowing illegitimate children to recover under
wrongful death and workmen's compensation statutes), with Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding a state intestate succession law which excluded ilegitimate children).
57. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
58. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
59. Cf.An Approach, supra note 2, at 143-46 (postulating the same rationale:
constitutional decisions might not be rationally reviewable).
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islation serves proper goals. The Court need not strike down a
statute serving valid purposes simply because the Court suspects
the legislators were pursuing the wrong goals. Such a law once
stricken could not be reenacted simply with a "laundered" legislative history. In the rare case where the lawmakers admit an improper motivation despite the fact that the law also serves proper
goals-for example, a law requiring elementary school students to
buy their own books, which is motivated by the desire to discourage poor minority students from attending school-the Court
could legitimately void the law and require any reenactment to
occur without reference to the improper considerations. 6 0 However, cases of admitted improper motivation are rare.
The kind of motivation (or purpose) that the Court determines
by these methods usually does not refer to the debates or to the
events immediately preceding the enactment of a given law. However, no doubt exists that the historical and factual setting in
which the particular statute was passed affects the Court's per6
ception of possible animus or prejudice in a given legislative act. 1

It is no accident that the Court frequently struck down statutes
burdening the NAACP in the 1960's62 and Jehovah's Witnesses in
the 1940's.63 The Court could have articulated the likelihood of
prejudice against such groups even more clearly than it did. The
Court could have relied on illicit motivation in examining the statute for signs of legitimate goals or effects that would justify the
law. Thus, the passage of a strict literacy test for new voters, immediately after a court held unconstitutional a previous law
which had disenfranchised blacks, had the clear effect-and motivation-of subjecting black voters to a screening device white voters never had to face.64 Similarly, the imposition of a tax on
60. Cf.Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270 n.21 (1977) (finding of discriminatory purpose shifts the burden of proof

but does not necessarily result in invalidation of the statute).
61. The Court suggests that evidence "whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" may include "a clear pattern" of state action; "[t]he
historical background of the decision.. ., [t]he specific sequence of events leadhe legislative or administrative history,"
ing up to the challenged decision. . ., [t]
and occasionally even testimony of members of the decisionmaking body. Id. at
266-68.
62. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investig'n Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
63. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
64. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

newspapers of a given circulation takes on special meaning when
it is shown that nearly all the newspapers affected opposed the
political machine enacting the law. 65 However, irrespective of
whether the inference of improper motivation or purpose depends
on the specific facts surrounding a bill's enactment, the method of
judicial analysis remains the same: First, does this law create effects raising a suspicion of improper motivation; and second, does
the law rebut this suspicion by adequately serving valid goals?
PURPOSE ANALYSIS COMPARED

wrIH BALANCING TESTS

I assert above that the Court usually determines motivation by
looking to the foreseeable effects of a law and by inferring from
these effects the purpose or motivation of the legislators. However, does judicial discussion of unconstitutional motivation differ
from a judicial conclusion, reached by a balancing test, that a statute's bad effects outweigh its good effects? If motivation is inferred by weighing a suspicion created by bad effects against a
justification based on good effects, one can argue that labeling the
outcome "purpose" adds nothing to the balance. Is not analysis of
purpose by this means merely another name for an ad hoc balancing test?
The reason this argument is unpersuasive and courts refer to
statutory purpose rather than to a balancing of interests seems
reasonably clear in the area of equal protection, where the courts
explicitly have recognized that the animus motivating a law, not
the balance of its social effects, is an adequate and an independent ground for declaring the law unconstitutional. Equal protection is designed not only to prevent purposeless discriminations
but also to identify those discriminations most likely to be invidious because they are historically repetitive and motivated by
prejudice or animus. 66 A law preventing black people from selling
eyeglasses without a prescription would be unconstitutional.
However, a law preventing optometrists from doing the same is
not unconstitutional 67 not only because race bears less relevance
to the ability to fit eyeglasses properly but also because legislatures historically have been prone to legislate on the basis of this
functional irrelevancy for reasons of animus or prejudice. Indeed,
repeated and pointless burdening is the epitome of bigotry or animus. Equal protection cases inevitably involve determinations of
65. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
66. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L.REV. 7 (1969); Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 358 (1949).
67. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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purpose because the historical expectation of bad purpose in relation to given kinds of discrimination conditions a court to scrutinize the state's justification with varying degrees of care. As
Professor Brest indicates, this expectation or suspicion of bad
purpose is inextricably tied to the strength or weakness of any
other valid justification and also to the sequence of events:
For example, state voting officials are enjoined from refusing to register
black applicants and the state then adopts difficult but apparently neutral
registration requirements; or, school districts are ordered to cease assigning students by race and the state then enacts a tuition grant law, or
abandons a public school system, or engages in other practices that tend
to maintain segregation. 68

Balancing tests are seldom referred to in equal protection cases
involving suspect classifications. To speak in such cases of determining whether a statute produces proper effects or proper goals
by considering the abstract "value" of such effects or goals is
doubtless possible. However, it seems strained to deny that this
determination is generally influenced by judicial knowledge of
legislatures' historic attitudes toward minority or other unpopular
groups or that the determination is made with an intuitive eye to
legislative motivation or purpose.
By contrast, in cases involving "fundamental rights" under the
first amendment, the equal protection clause, or the remainder of
the Constitution, the Court, without referring to purpose, frequently undertakes to "balance" the individual interests protected by the Constitution against the state's interest in
regulating them. 69 This balancing approach, for reasons that can
be briefly summarized, has been criticized-rightly in my
view-by other scholars7 0 as a non-test or as a form of ad hoc judicial decisionmaking. As Professor Emerson concludes, ad hoc
balancing contains no hard core of doctrine to guide a court in
reaching a decision. The factual determinations involved in evaluating the utility of a given law and its impact on individual rights
are complicated and time-consuming. Under the ad hoc balancing
test, the courts tend to defer to legislative judgments on the ques68. An Approach, supra note 2, at 122-23.
69. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Emerson, Toward
a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE IJ. 877, 912-14 (1963); Frantz,
The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
70. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE
L.T. 877, 912-14 (1963); Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. I. REv. 729 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE .J. 1424 (1962).

tions of broad policy involved. The test gives no real meaning to
constitutional provisions but states only that legislatures may restrict protected rights whenever it is reasonable for them to do so.
Finally, the balancing process does not afford government officials or interested parties advance guidance concerning the way a
court could decide any given case because each case turns largely
on its given facts and on the intuitive and unpredictable judgment
about these facts.V'
I do not suggest that the balancing of interests and intuitive
judgments about their relative weights can be eliminated from
constitutional adjudication; it is an inevitable part of this highly
unscientific process. However, the Court should do its balancing
with an eye to the requirements of the constitutional provisions it
applies. In a great many instances these provisions guard against
the possibility that certain kinds of legislative regulation will be
motivated by prejudice against unpopular groups and interests.
Indeed, it is this suspicion of malfunction in the majoritarian
democratic process which requires enforcement of the Constitution by courts rather than by the political branches.72 In order to
justify its intrusion upon the democratic process when it holds
laws unconstitutional, the Court needs to explain in some principled way what kinds of laws will be suspect and for what reasons.73
71. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 912-13 (1963).
72. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 37-41 (1962) (stating that
courts in constitutional cases distinguish between legislative acts based on "rationality" and those based on "uncontrolled emotion"); Choper, On the Warren
Court and JudicialReview, 17 CATH.U.L. REV. 20, 38-41 (1967). Choper states that:
[C]onstitutional guarantees [of individual rights]-such as the freedoms
of speech and religion, the constitutional rights of those accused of crime,
the right to be free from certain racial discrimination--are generally rights
of 'politically impotent minorities.' By definition, the processes of democracy bode poorly for the security of such rights .... Thus, the task of
guarding these constitutionally prescribed liberties sensibly falls upon a
body that is not politically responsible, that is not beholden to the grace of
excited majoritariasm-othe United StatesSupreme Court. Herein lies
the
jutification
po
judi
eview, the wisdom of Marburygreat
v. Madison.
In this area, the Court, if it is properly to fulfill its place
in American democratic society, must act more forcely-perhaps 'by
creating
presumption
against thethe
validity
of the
contested
perhaps 'by amore
closely scrutinizing
methods
employed
andaction,'
the objeclead.'
they
which
tives to
Id. at 40-41.
73. See Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971):
[T]he Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in
reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of majority and minority freedom. If it does
not have such a theory but merely imposes its own value choices, or
worse if it pretends to have a theory but actually follows its own predilections, the Court violates the postulates of the Madisonian model that
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A determination by the Court that a suspect law is or is not arbitrary because it burdens racial minorities or free speech necessarily involves some balancing of interests. For example, as indicated above, a law segregating prisoners by race probably will be
upheld or stricken depending on whether the segregation is demonstrably necessary to prevent racial violence among prisoners. 74 A court confronted with such a case necessarily makes a
subjective judgment on the basis of the evidence that such a
threat is or is not serious, accordingly imputes to the prison officials either a good faith or a bad faith motivation, and on that basis upholds or strikes down the law. However, one can acknowledge a kind of balancing in this context and can also acknowledge
as a matter of common sense and intuition that the process of
looking for evidence of probable legislative prejudice is different
from balancing the good and bad effects of the law. The Court
should neither attempt to disguise the fact that it does consider
the good and the bad effects of the law nor fail to articulate the
fears of invidious legislative behavior to which that consideration
relates.75
The libel cases decided by the Supreme Court serve as an illustration.6 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 7 a southern jury
had assessed a $500,000 defamation judgment against a northern
newspaper because it published an editorial advertisement containing allegedly false statements criticizing unnamed state officials for their roles in opposing racial integration. The Court went
through a balancing process, concluding that newspapers' freedom to publish would likely be chilled by such judgments and
that on balance the Constitution requires that defamation judgments for speech critical of public officials should not be allowed
unless the speech was knowingly or recklessly false and was
made "of and concerning" the particular official suing. Such a balance clearly does take place and must be recognized simply because the interests of the press and of the defamed plaintiff
alone justifies its power. It then necessarily abets the tyranny either of
the majority or of the minority.
74. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
75. My major disagreement with Professor Fiss is that he evaluates laws which
violate his principle of status harm to a specially disadvantaged group by an apparently abstract balancing process, weighing the harm a given law causes the
group against the benefits it causes society. Fiss, supra note 40, at 168.
76. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
77. 376 U.S. 254, (1964).

conflict and thus require resolution. However, to say that the balancing occurs in a vacuum, by weighing values abstractly, ignores
the facts in the Sullivan case. The heart of the matter is that a
southern jury penalized a northern newspaper for publishing
facts outraging the jury's sense of community values. The jury's
anger certainly appeared to be inspired not so much by what was
false in the civil rights advertisement as by what was true in it.78
Indeed, juries as a class are likely to react with animus against
unpopular speakers because of their lack of legal training and
their lack of accountability regarding the verdict they render. If
the Supreme Court were to allow juries to censure political
speech they disliked under the guise of rendering compensation
for damaged reputation-and to rely upon the weak reed of the
trial judge's power to order a remittitur to prevent such occurrences-censorship of political speech would be a reality.
This sense of animus, or of fair play versus foul play, is an inherent ingredient of any person's "gut reaction" to the fairness of
governmental action. It is an inevitable part of the Court's reaction. It is this sense of animus or unfairness that entitles the
Supreme Court to use its power under the Constitution to override legislatures which have acted unfairly or which have given
local officials or even juries the power to do so.
The Court should express its balancing of values in terms of
fear of legislative or of other governmental prejudice. When the
Court fails to express itself, it also often fails to justify its intervention into the legislative process in situations where no legislative malfunction is apparent. 79 The further discussion of the libel
cases appearing below illustrates this point, as does the discus78. The editorial advertisement alleged that southern civil rights demonstrators
were being met with "an unprecedented wave of terror" and illustrated this allegation with specific events. The defamed plaintiff, Sullivan, was one of three elected
Commissioners of Public Affairs with jurisdiction over police and other departments in Montgomery, Alabama. He alleged inter alia that because the advertisement suggested Montgomery "police" had ringed a college campus after a
demonstration, he was implicated and defamed. However, Sullivan failed to allege
any pecuniary damages. Not only was the link between Sullivan and the alleged
wrongdoing tenuous, but the alleged misstatements tended to matters of detail
rather than substance. For example, the police had not "ringed" the campus but
merely had been deployed in large numbers near it, the students had not sung
"My Country 'tis of Thee" as alleged but rather the National Anthem, the students
had not protested by refusing to re-register as alleged but rather by boycotting
classes, and no one had padlocked the students' dining hall as alleged. However, it
was apparently undisputed that the advertisement had truthfully alleged that the
students' leaders were expelled from school for singing the anthem, that police
were brought in as a result, and that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was harassed because of his civil rights demonstrations. Id. at 256-60.
79. For example, consider the Court's actions with regard to commercial speech
and libel See text accompanying notes 126-48 infra.
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sion of the Court's decision to protect commercial speech under
the Constitution. In short, explicit discussion of the existence of
animus or prejudice properly forces the Court to consider when
the social contract has been broken and consequently when judicial intervention is warranted under the Constitution.
It also should be noted that it is an inadequate objection to say
that in a given case the legislature might not actually be motivated by economic considerations when, for example, it passes a

law restricting the right to travel which also has the effect of economic protectionism. First, as argued above, although the actual
psychological motivation of the legislature never can be known
accurately, its probability can be gauged by the law's language or
by inference from the law's effects. The degree of indeterminacy
necessarily inherent in this inference does not make the infer-

ence less necessary or less valid. Second, the presumption of unconstitutionality which should attach to such a law serves
prophylactic purposes, warning legislatures that certain effects
will not be tolerated because of the probability of prejudice quite
apart from any showing of its actual existence. 80
For these reasons, I see no reason to depart from my initial position that a good purpose or motivation will be presumed by the
Court whenever a statutory burden or distinction logically relates

to some proper governmental goals and that a bad purpose or motivation will be presumed when no such connection adequately
rebuts a suspicion of bad purpose. It is possible to imagine a stat-

ute serving absolutely no purpose simply by mistake or by indi80. Because true psychological purpose in the sense of a consensus may be
nonexistent in a group such as a jury, a legislature, or a series of judicial opinions--or if existent, unknowable in the majority of cases-certain effects are
deemed proscribable without regard to purpose as a means of preventing or fencing off intentional interferences with rights. To use a homely example, assume
that a small child decides to play a game at the dinner table which consists of
dropping his or her spoon on the floor, to be retrieved by a parent. When the parent tires of this game after the second drop, the parent instructs the child to stop
dropping the silverware. Shortly thereafter the child drops the spoon again, and in
defense declares that the last drop was accidental. After several more repetitions
of this "accident," the parent is liable to tell the child that if the spoon drops again,
accidentally or otherwise, certain consequences will follow as a matter of strict liability-leaving the table, having the food removed, having to retrieve the spoon
himself; or being visited by other consequences. All this could mean that the parent neither believes that any of the effects were accidental nor that any future
ones could be. More likely, however, the parent is willing to run the risk of punishing behavior which is truly involuntary in order to avoid arguing over motivation
before punishing a probably voluntary misdeed.

rection, rather than through bad motivation, and thus invalid
because simply arbitrary. However, not all pointless statutes are
unconstitutional. The Court does and should guard against only
those mistaken laws occurring in areas of traditional legislative
8
malfunction. 1
PURPOSE VERSUS BALANCING: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

An illustration using the "fundamental" constitutional right to
travel may serve to clarify the difference between ad hoc balancing and concern for legislative motivation. In the 1975 case of
Sona v. Iowa,8 2 the Court upheld against an equal protection
right-to-travel challenge an Iowa law requiring a one-year residency period before a plaintiff could file for divorce. Although the
Court had previously stricken requirements of one year and less
84
for receiving welfare 83 and medical care on the part of indigents,
the Court in Sosna upheld the requirement with respect to divorce. In terms of a balance of interests, the case seems difficult
to reconcile with its predecessors and may indeed simply signal
an unannounced retreat from the right-to-travel activism of earlier cases. The plaintiff's interest in receiving a divorce in Sosna
seems at least as important as the rights involved in previous
cases. Indeed, the Court has characterized the right to divorce as
"fundamental" and as something the state must furnish without
cost to indigents, 85 a requirement it has not set forth with regard
to welfare or to medical care, for example. Moreover, the inability
to obtain a divorce for a year very realistically might deter a
plaintiff with marital difficulties from moving to a state with such
a residency requirement, thus directly affecting the right to
travel.86 Although the Court explained that the decree of divorce
was merely postponed and not permanently denied87 by this requirement, the argument was equally available but did not prevail
in all the previous cases where the Court upheld the right to
travel.
On the other side of the balance, Iowa's interest in the law
seems highly attenuated in comparison with the interests in pre81. Indeed, the Court has upheld laws which realistically can be described as
pointless. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
82. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).

83. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
84 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
85. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671-72 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting state's evidence that only a small number of persons were deterred from

moving by reason of one-year welfare residency requirement).
87. 419 U.S. at 406.
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vious cases where the laws were stricken. The Court explained
that the Sosna requirement was not based on purely budgetary
considerations or on administrative convenience but rather assured a "modicum of attachment" to the state before marital
rights were disturbed. The law also served an interest "in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral
attack," which might occur in the absence of a durational residency requirement. 88 However, as Justice Marshall pointed out in
dissent,8 9 the previous cases also involved laws which sought to
assure a "modicum of attachment" to the state. Also, weighty interests hinging on a divorce adjudication cut as much in favor of a
reasonably speedy adjudication as against one. Finally, the Court
agreed that a one-year durational residency requirement is by no
means essential in avoiding collateral attacks on divorce decrees
under the full faith and credit clause 0
At best, the balancing in Sosna identifies the state's interests
in postponing adjudication as well as the individual's interests in
obtaining a faster judgment. Yet, the reasons one set of interests
should outweigh the other are not made apparent in other than
conclusory terms emphasizing the reasonableness of the state's
interest and minimizing those of the individual. At worst, the
analysis in Sosna ignores individual interests protected in previous cases and fails to apply the kind of strict scrutiny that previous right-to-travel cases indicated is necessary.
A balancing approach not considering legislative purpose thus
involves several difficulties. First, it is difficult to know what interests to weigh on each side of the balance. Is the right-to-travel
interest only the interest of the individual plaintiff, or is it the interests of all persons moving into the state who may desire divorces? Must the court consider the extent to which the divorce
waiting period actually deters people from moving into the state,
or take notice of the nuisance effect of such a requirement, irrespective of whether travel is actually deterred? Are these quantifications irrelevant, so that the court only need find that some
deterrence to travel for some indeterminate number of people is
created and then go immediately to a consideration of the state's
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id. at 418 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See generally Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945).

interest? Similarly, in considering the state's interest, should the
court examine only the argument that some divorce decrees will
be collaterally attacked, or should it consider the state's more diffuse interest in granting divorces only to persons with a significant interest in remaining in the state?
The second difficulty in a balancing approach that ignores legislative purpose is that the Constitution provides no guidance concerning when personal interests in travel or in speech outweigh
countervailing state interests. Indeed, this very problem led Justices Douglas and Black to protest against balancing in the first
amendment area. In their view, if the first amendment is not "absolute" so that free speech interests always prevail, then the first
amendment is as subject to subversion by a balancing court as by
a legislature. 91 Similarly, in Sosna, how is the plaintiff's right to
unrestricted travel comparable with the state's interest in due
process contacts that shore up the validity of its adjudications?
The Court provides no answer to this question, nor could it. The
Court simply concludes that in this case, on these facts, the
state's interest is more important.
Nonetheless, in terms of legislative purpose, the decision in
Sosna makes some sense with respect to the underlying concerns
of the constitutional right-to-travel provisions and to the danger
against which they are designed to guard. Although Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's decision on the ground that the
state's law constituted a "penalty" on the right to travel, 92 it can
be argued that the law need not be suspected of the kind of invidious legislative purpose against which the right-to-travel provisions are designed to guard. It seems reasonable to conclude that
the interstate commerce clause, the interstate privileges and immunities clause, the equal protection clause, and the penumbral
right to travel referred to in some opinions 93 all are centrally concerned with the prevention of repeated attempts by state legislatures to exclude undesirable persons, such as paupers or foreign
business competitors, from their borders for economic or other
selfish reasons.94 Indeed, the Constitution and Marbury v.
Madison require such legislation to be overturned precisely because state legislatures would otherwise predictably opt for the
91. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
U.C.LA. L- Rav. 428 (1967).

92. 419 U.S. at 418 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
94. For historical confirmation of this kind of economic protection predating the
Constitution, see C. SwisHER, Am EcA CONsTrrTUToNAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27
(1954).
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short-term benefits of economic protectionism rather than for the

long-term benefits of free trade and free movement, given that
out-of-staters bearing the most immediate burdens of economically protective laws are unrepresented in the legislatures. Reference to this constitutional policy suggests that laws which should
be most suspected of infringing on the right to travel are those
most frequently problematic: namely, laws passed with the legislative motivation of securing economic advantage over out-of-staters or that of excluding unpopular people or groups. For
example, states have a venerable history of attempting to exclude
indigents from their territories and their welfare rolls, primarily
for economic reasons and also, possibly, for reasons of class animus.9 5 The Sosna Court's explanation-that the state's interest in
these cases was merely "budgetary"-thus seems apt in light of
the concerns of right-to-travel protection. The cases involving a
residency requirement for voting perhaps can be explained better
in terms of the fundamental right to vote than in terms of the fundamental right to travel. Although the state is unlikely to deny
the vote in order to exclude undesirables from the state, the
Court has been exceedingly critical of attempts to limit the
franchise on the basis of voters' qualifications in terms of their
"stake" in the state, whether that stake is wealth, property ownership, or duration of residency. 96 Likewise, the law in Sosna did
not give rise to the kinds of concern that the right to travel guards
against. Unlike indigents seeking welfare benefits, divorce plaintiffs hardly constitute a class of persons the state has any invidious reason for excluding. In the absence of any reason to suspect
the state legislature of invidious motives, strict judicial scrutiny of
the law's constitutionality does not seem warranted.
This is not to say that the Court could not have found a way to
rationalize striking the law by referring to purpose. It can be argued that newcomers to a state are an insular minority whose
best interests are never represented in state government. There95. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6

Wall.) 35 (1867).
96. The argument that wealth and property ownership are proper qualifications
of the right to vote (because the voter can then be shown to have a greater stake
in the cbmmunity) has been rejected in several decisions. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But see Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). Durational residency

tests also are subject to strict scrutiny. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

fore, all laws burdening them should be strictly scrutinized. Yet
newcomers who are not economic, political, or religious undesirables hardly seem to meet the criteria characterizing other
"insular minorities" receiving special judicial protection. 9 7 Rather,
they more closely resemble the many economic minorities receiving insubstantial constitutional protection from the courts.
If the Sosna Court had explicitly considered purpose or motivation, it would have achieved two primary advantages over the balancing approach. First, consideration of motive or purpose
requires the Court to consider the reasons the Constitution requires judicial intervention in terms of whether the legislative
process is likely to be inadequate. These reasons primarily involve legislative burdening of unpopular and unrepresented
groups. Although out-of-staters differ from other typical victims of
"majoritarianism" because they are less stigmatized by discrimination, the motivation of such laws is nonetheless invidious. That
the invidiousness derives from the limits placed on economic selfprotection by a federal system, rather than from proscriptions of
race or of class animus, should not affect the Court's concern for
motivation rather than balancing. Were it not for consideration of
the need for judicial intervention under the Constitution, economic substantive due process would have as equal a claim to judicial enforcement as do equal protection safeguards against
racial discrimination. 98 Indeed, the Court's failure to explain why
it, rather than the legislatures, should decide when to allow intrusions on constitutional rights such as privacy has given rise to
charges that the Court has created a "revival of substantive due
process" 9 9 and is sitting as a superlegislature when such mi97. For a list of these criteria, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(plurality opinion). Newcomers may be considered members of a historically disadvantaged group, and in general they certainly lack proportionate representation
in the legislature as a class. The status of being a newcomer also may be irrelevant
to being a good citizen in most respects. However, the status of being a newcomer
obviously is not immutable or permanent, unlike race or sex. Moreover, the newcomer is not obviously identifiable as such, nor is he or she likely to be treated as
a second-class citizen in many of his or her social contacts.
98. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). One
scholar has argued that the Court also could consider economic groups having little political clout "discrete and insular minorities" deserving of enhanced protection. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 50. Yet the "would-be barmaids of Michigan or
the would-be plumbers of Illinois" are not persons immutably defined as members
of these groups. Id. Furthermore, particular occupational groups such as these
have not been subjected to persistent historical discrimination precisely because
in the general population little animus or prejudice toward occupational groups
exists except perhaps toward the most economically successful and therefore the
most powerful groups.
99. G. GuNTER,CONsTiTmoNAL LAw: CASES AND MATERuIALS 616 (9th ed. 1975).
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noritarian control is neither needed nor justified.100
The second primary advantage of purpose or motivation over
the balancing process is that reference to purpose permits a
clearer explanation why certain laws will be stricken down and
others will not. Obviously, the balancing process and its problems
are not eliminated. However, at least the courts could establish
categories of laws that they will scrutinize more carefully than
others-for example, in addition to laws affecting travel, laws primarily affecting persons who will be expensive to the state or persons whom the state for some other reason has a selfish reason to
exclude. The result would be that some kinds of laws-those affecting only "desirable" immigrants-would not need to be examined at all. With respect to "costly" immigrants, the Court
could begin the job of defining when, in light of the constitutional
scheme, the states should be permitted to burden travel. One example of a valid burden would be discouraging people from moving to the state in order to take advantage of benefits paid for by
state taxes: If they were allowed to do so, the state's ability to offer this benefit might ultimately be destroyed.O' Denial of instate tuition to state university students who have recently moved
to the state is one example of a burden on travel the Court will
sustain in order to prevent a resource from being depleted by outof-staters entering the state to take advantage of it.102 Moreover,
the Court could begin to formulate rules concerning the burden of
proof in such cases, requiring, for example, that the state prove
that the elimination of benefit restrictions for newcomers would
indeed result in a critical impairment of the state's ability to offer
benefits.103

For an explicit judicial approval of substantive due process doctrine, see Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
100. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
101. Although the Court gave short shrift to the argument that a state may en-

act a durational residency requirement to discourage indigents from moving to it
for the purpose of taking advantage of its higher welfare benefits, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-32 (1969), the Court did not confront any additional ar-

gument that such an influx probably would eliminate the state's ability to offer
welfare benefits at their present levels.

102. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401
U.S. 985 (1971), cited with approvalin Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409 (1975).
103. Apparently, under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the state al-

ready bears this burden.

By considering legislative motivation, the Court can begin to
define both the impermissible and the permissible goals legislation affecting travel may serve. Furthermore, the Court can generalize to some extent about the proof it will require to demonstrate
that the presence or the absence of the law will produce undesirable effects. In Professor Eisenberg's terms, the Court thus can
begin to define limits on governmental power, with explicit reference to the need for preventive curbs on invidiously motivated
laws. 0 4 This is not to say that the Court will decide in each instance whether the legislature had the collective psychological intent in right-to-travel cases of advancing economic protectionism
as opposed to some other, valid goal. It is to say that the Court
can establish a prophylactic rule that given effects-for example,
exclusion of poor persons-are those a legislature is prone to advance for the wrong reasons.
The latter part of this article sets forth specific examples of constitutional protections the purposes of which the Court could
profitably state explicitly in terms of presumptions about improper legislative purpose or motivation. Because nearly all judicially enforced constitutional provisions could be discussed in
this vein, this article undertakes to be illustrative but far from exhaustive.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

"Invidious motivation" and "invidious purpose" have been
terms associated primarily with discrimination held unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. However, invidious motivation or purpose is also highly relevant to first amendment
adjudication. These thoughts are not altogether new. I partially
developed them in an article published two years ago,' 0 5 and
Professors Karst,10 6 Eisenberg' 0 7 and Tribe08 subsequently have
highlighted the relevance of "first amendment equal protection"
to certain issues of free speech. My intention here is to develop
this viewpoint at greater length than before and then to apply it
to a variety of free speech issues.
Historically, the animus produced by differences of politics and
religion has closely paralleled, if not exceeded, the degree of animus generated by differences of race or of nationality. Indeed, the
104. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 141-43.
105. Clark, Civil and CriminalPenaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 MoN. L Rnv. 379, 447-49 (1976).

106. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. Cm. L.
REV. 20 (1975).

107. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 134-39.
108. L. TRmE, AmEtUcAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 576-608 (1978).
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original migrants to this continent from Europe and the British
Isles were individuals whose religious and political beliefs and
speech subjected them to persecution in their homelands. Laws
regulating the content of speech or of religious belief have historically carried as much suspicion of prejudice or animus as laws
discriminating on the basis of race, illegitimacy, alienage, or sex.
Like racial laws, laws regulating speech content frequently produce stigma and a sense of unjustly inflicted animus. Also, like
racial laws, laws regulating speech or religion frequently tend to
be arbitrary because our Constitution embodies the premise that
society at large cannot with certainty divine ultimate truths about
politics, religion, morality, or lifestyle.
The ill effects of laws regulating speech or religion may produce
not only a sense of stigma but a variety of other effects. As Professor Emerson has shown,109 other ill effects include interference with individual self-fulfillment, in terms of the ability both to
form and to express opinions and beliefs; interference with the
discovery of truth; interference with communication between the
governors and the governed, resulting in interference with the responsiveness of the social system; and finally, interference with
the balance between stability and change.
It can be argued that any law restricting speech or regulating
religion causes these ill effects regardless of the motivation for its
enactment. Under this view, the motivation of the lawmaker and
the resulting senses of stigma and of breach of faith are consequently less important in the first amendment area than in the
equal protection area. However, this assertion appears incorrect.
If lawmakers could be trusted to maintain proper respect for the
harms against which the first amendment guards, courts would
need to play no greater role in enforcing this clause than they do
in enforcing the tenth amendment and economic equal protection.
It is precisely because lawmakers, whether legislators or law enforcers, do have the historical propensity, because of political and
religious prejudice, to create these harms that intervention by the
Court is needed to overturn such laws under the Constitution and
to set out preventive rules of constitutional interpretation forestalling the enactment of laws that might be enforced discriminatorily against unpopular speech or religion. The Court's extensive
109. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72

877, 879-86 (1963).

YALE I.J.

activity in the first amendment area is not unlike the activity of a
police department wisely concentrating its forces in areas of the
highest crime potential.
In my view, the first amendment is needed primarily to protect
against invidiously mofivated suppression of unpopular points of
view. Therefore, a concern for motivation suggests that certain
types of speech regulation should be permitted because the
speech in question is not likely to arouse prejudice (commercial
speech, for instance) or because the law serves some valid purpose other than suppressing speech (for example, compensation
for harm caused by defamatory statements).
Finally, a concern for motivation explains on the one hand why
it is permissible in some cases to ban all political speech and on
the other hand why it is impermissible to single out particular political viewpoints. If one were concerned only with effects, it certainly could be argued that the banning of all political speakers
from an army base'"O or from transit advertising"'l creates a
greater harm than the banning of only one faction. However, if
the fear of intentional and invidious discrimination between rival
points of view is a central first amendment concern, the banning
of all political speech in certain contexts is far more innocuous
than the banning of only one point of view.
As the motivational concerns of the equal protection clause and
the first amendment are similar, so are the Court's approaches to
cases under these two clauses. In equal protection, a "suspect
classification" produces a presumption of invidious motivation or
purpose which only a demonstration that the law serves a "compelling state interest" can rebut. Similarly, in the area of free
speech, a law classifying on the basis of speech content is likewise suspected of an invidious motivation to suppress or to punish given points of view. Only a showing that a compelling state
interest-usually described in terms of the likelihood that the
speech produces a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
the state has a right to prevent--can rebut the resulting presumption of invidious purpose.112 Such a compelling state interest may
consist, for example, of the likelihood that the words will produce
110. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
111. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
112. According to the Court, the test is whether "such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). As originally formulated by Justice Holmes, the test is whether the words are such "as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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acts of subversion,1 3 a breach of the peace,"14 or unjustified harm
to another individual's reputation."15
There are times when it clearly seems appropriate for the Court
to consider specific historical facts surrounding a particular piece
of legislation and to conclude that on balance it was motivated by
an illicit purpose. Such a case is Grosjean v. American Press
Co.,"16 where a special tax wag imposed only on large newspapers, most of which opposed the political party in power. However, in most cases it is not the proven historical actuality but the
historically supported suspicion and fear of motivation that leads
the Court to strike down a given kind of law as a preventive or a
prophylactic measure. The following discussion serves only to illustrate and not to exhaust this reasoning concerning the first
amendment. Obvious examples not addressed include the Court's
holdings that broad delegations of investigative power to legislative committees 1' 7 and required disclosure of membership lists by
private organizations": 8 are unconstitutional because both kinds
of laws pose the clear risk of discriminatory enforcement against,
and harassment of, unpopular minority points of view.
Professor Tribe has provided a coherent articulation of this general approach to the first amendment in his epochal treatise
American ConstitutionalLaw, published earlier this year."19 Professor Tribe describes two kinds of laws which can abridge free
speech and two corresponding judicial reactions to such laws:
First,government can aim at ideas or information, in the sense of singling out actions for government control or penalty either (a) because of
the specific viewpoint such actions express, or (b) because of the effects
produced by awareness of the information such actions impart....
Second, without aiming at ideas or information in either of the above
senses, government can constrict the flow of information and ideas while
pursuing other goals, either (a) by limiting an activity through which information and ideas might be conveyed, or (b) by enforcing rules compliance with which might discourage the communication of ideas or
information .... The first form of abridgement may be summarized as encompassing government actions aimed at communicative impact; the second, as encompassing government actions aimed at noncommunicative

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investig'n Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoxsvrrumoNAL LAW 576-736 (1978).

impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on communicative opportunity.120

With regard to the first kind of law, Professor Tribe states that
the regulation will be held unconstitutional (and indeed is presumed to be so) unless the government can show a clear and
present danger or can show that the regulated communication
falls outside the speech protected by the first amendment.121
With regard to the second kind of law, Professor Tribe states that
ad hoc balancing of free speech interests against other governmental interests is permissible under the rubric that the law may
22
not "unduly" constrict the flow of information and ideas.1
In general, my agreement with Professor Tribe's view of first
amendment adjudication far outweighs my disagreements, and I
think he has done a thoroughly admirable job of organizing first
amendment doctrine. Professor Tribe's analysis is generally similar to the valuable views of Professors Karst and Eisenberg,
which I summarize and to some extent criticize below. 123 I do,
120. Id. at 580.
121. Id. at 582.
122. Id.
123. Professor Karst enunciates an "equality principle," stating that the first
amendment is designed to prevent the goveinment from discriminating against
speech or against speakers because of the content of the communication. Karst
also observes that the persons most likely to suffer from such discrimination are
the disadvantaged of our society. Karst, supra note 106, at 30. Karst would permit
regulation based on speech content only if a compelling state interest (or, presumably, a "clear and present danger") required it. He therefore would have the Court
eliminate its doctrine that certain forms of expression such as obscenity, libel, and
fighting words are not "speech" and in each case would have the Court look to the
harm requiring regulation.
Professor Eisenberg similarly refers to "rights of equality" in the first amendment, defined as "the right not to be disadvantaged because the government disapproves of one's expression." Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 136. In keeping with his
and Professor Brest's view of the role of motivation, Eisenberg states that motivation may be used to invalidate a law if it can be shown that a law not facially classifying or burdening on the basis of speech content in fact has, and was intended
to have, this effect by the lawmaker.
My view of the role of motivation in the first amendment is related to, but more
general than, the views of Karst, Eisenberg, and Tribe. Karst, like Tribe, does not
take into account the fact that regulation of certain kinds of speech content is
likely, in terms of governmental prejudice, to be more invidious than regulation of
other kinds. By stating simply that discrimination based on speech content is invalid until justified by a compelling state interest, Karst runs the danger of ignoring the fact that discrimination in the area of commercial speech, and advertising
limitations against all political speech but in favor of all commercial speech, as in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), are not discriminations singling out historically disadvantaged minorities and therefore can be considered
less suspect than other forms of discrimination. Karst, supra at 34.
My disagreement with Eisenberg lies in his relatively narrow concept of motivation, see text accompanying notes 258-74 infra. Eisenberg's concept goes only to
finding "hidden" legislative goals and not to discussing the fears of legislative malfunction which should make certain kinds of speech regulation suspect and others
not suspect--or at least less so.
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however, differ from Professor Tribe on two points which are central to the discussion which follows and which I will briefly summarize.
First, Professor Tribe's interest in legislative motivation is apparently limited to whether the law is "aimed at" regulation of
speech content. This concern is indeed a major one in first
amendment law. Focusing attention on this question clearly helps
a great deal in explicating symbolic speech and other cases. However, after a court has found a purpose of regulating speech content, Professor Tribe appears to resort to a balancing test (albeit
heavily weighted toward a finding of unconstitutionality) in determining whether a clear and present danger exists. 124 I do not disagree that a sort of balancing does occur, but I think that, as
stated above, 125 it occurs in the context of determining whether
an invidious, censorial motivation was likely present. Most laws
regulating speech content evince such a motivation. Yet, as I argue below, the regulation of commercial speech content need not
be seen as invidiously motivated, because such regulation is unlikely to be aimed at accomplishing the typical evil of censorship-namely, the prejudiced suppression of unpopular ideas.
Neither properly drafted laws prohibiting fighting words nor
124. Professor Tribe states:
[T]he "balancers" are right in concluding that it is impossible to escape
the task of weighing the competing considerations. Although only the
case-by-case approach of track two takes the form of an explicit evaluation
of the importance of the governmental interests said to justify each challenged regulation, similar judgments underlie the categorical definitions
on track one. Any exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment
safeguards represents an implicit conclusion that the governmental interests in regulating those activities are such as to justify whatever limitation
is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas. Thus, determinations of
the reach of first amendment protections on either track presuppose some
form of "balancing" whether or not they appear to do so. The question is
whether the "balance" should be struck for all cases in the process of
framing particular categorical definitions, or whether the "balance" should
be calibrated anew on a case-by-case basis.
L.

TRmE, A

ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

583

(1978).

Professor Tribe goes on to acknowledge that "categorical rules, by drawing clear
lines, are usually less open to manipulation because they leave less room for the
prejudices of the factfinder to insinuate themselves into a decision." Id. at 584. In
this sense, therefore, he acknowledges the utility of constitutional rules as a prophylactic defense against unconstitutionally motivated actions by law enforcers or
law interpreters. He states that "[c]ategorical rules thus tend to protect the system of free expression better because they are more likely to work in spite of the
defects in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve fundamental
liberties." Id.
125. See text accompanying notes 66-81 supra.

those prohibiting intentional incitement of subversion aim solely
or primarily at the invidious suppression of truth. In short, as the
following sections of this article illustrate, the inquiry into the
justification for a law regulating speech content should be itself
an inquiry into motivation, and recognition of this fact would lead
to a difference in the outcome in a significant number of cases.
Second, I am not sure that Professor Tribe's second category of
laws should be evaluated by an ad hoc balancing process independent of a concern for motivation. It is true that laws regulating the time, place, and manner of communication generally have
been upheld or have been stricken depending on their 'reasonableness" and that the Court has generally approached this evaluation on an ad hoc basis. However, as the following discussion
illustrates, the Court needs to articulate the extent to which it
fears that such time, place, and manner laws may be used for invidious, censorial reasons. In other words, one can recognize the
greater presumption of constitutionality attaching to laws not expressly regulating speech content and still demand assurances
that such laws probably were neither passed for censorial reasons
nor are likely to enable the persons enforcing the law to make
censorial decisions. Again, evaluations of the law's justifications-not just of its concern with time, place, and manner-need
to consider expressly the motivation of the law's makers and the
potential motivation of its enforcers.
Libel
Although proscriptions of libel generally originate in the common law rather than in legislation, analysis of purpose is nonetheless instructive. In general, the Court's rule limiting states' ability
to regulate libel is consonant with the clear and present danger
test it has applied to most other attempts to regulate speech content. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,126 the Court established
that libel laws may prohibit only knowingly or recklessly false
statements of fact made of and concerning individual public
figures. This decision creates a test that squares with the general
clear and present danger requirement that regulated speech must
be willfully intended and likely to produce imminent harm. However, for a considerable time the Court remained uncertain about
the relative protection to be given persons who allegedly defame
private persons as opposed to public figures. Ultimately, in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court has concluded that a defamed private person can be compensated (though not subjected to puni126. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tive damages) whenever a false statement of fact is made with
27
negligence or with some other degree of fault.1
The Court traditionally has defended its libel doctrine in balancing terms, weighing the harm to reputation from uncompensated falsehoods against the need to protect freedom of speech
and of press from the chilling effect generated by an "intolerable"
requirement that publishers meet the impossible goal of guaranteeing the accuracy of their statements. 128 Similarly, the Court
has used balancing to explain the difference in the protection that
public and private figures receive. The Court has stated that the
public figure should receive less protection because he or she is
better able to rebut false statements than are most private persons. Also, the Court has stated that most public figures have chosen to seek public attention and thus have assumed the risk of
29
false criticism, whereas private persons have not.1
Certainly these factors identify ways in which public figures
and private persons differ. However, the Court has made no attempt to measure or to quantify its conclusions. The argument
that public figures realistically assume the risk of their reputations' wrongful destruction is unpersuasive. Surely, none would
assume this risk absent the Court's pronouncement that he must.
Also unconvincing is the argument that public figures realistically
can rebut false criticism more effectively than can private persons. Furthermore, some people classified as "public figures" are,
as the Court admits,130 drawn into the controversy involuntarily,
not seeking publicity. Finally, in terms of newsworthiness, the
public interest in knowing about some private persons may exceed the public interest in knowing about minor public officials.
Thus, the protection needed by the press, under a balancing test,
theoretically should be greater in these cases.
Little except the Court's collective intuition explains the ultimate decision that the interest in free speech and in free debate
outweighs the interest in compensation for negligently false statements of fact about public figures but not about private figures.
The Court has explained the factors it considers in its balance;
yet only an ipse dixit explains the relative weight of these factors.
It can, of course, be argued that this type of judicial explanation is
127. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

128. Id. at 340.
129. Id. at 343-46.

130. Id. at 345.

adequate because the Court has been selected as the final balancer, albeit ad hoc and legislative, of such value conflicts. If this
method of resolution seems less than ideally principled, it nonetheless can be accepted as inevitably typical of the American system of constitutional adjudication.131
Nonetheless, one can make a more systematic explanation of
the libel doctrine by reference to the purpose or motivation of
judges and juries assessing damages in such cases. The general
purpose of the first amendment is to prevent the government
from silencing the ideas of unpopular people, or from punishing
them for holding or voicing those ideas, when their views run
counter to the interests of government or of the popular majority.
In theory, the compensation of harm caused by defamatory statements does not run counter to this first amendment interest, for it
seems legitimate, as the Court has stated, to conclude that demonstrable falsehoods are valueless and are not worth protecting. 3 2 However, in practice, popular prejudice can easily
cause juries not only to find that unpopular statements are false
when they are not, but also to punish the publisher of the statement rather than merely to compensate actual harm, which in
any case is usually vague and indefinite in amount.133 Indeed, this
seems to be precisely what happened in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,l3 4 where a southern jury assessed $500,000 in damages
against the New York Times for publishing an editorial advertisement criticizing local southern officials for suppressing civil rights
demonstrations. Although the advertisement was inaccurate in
minor respects, 35 it seems clear that the jury was more incensed
by the unpopular political truths in the statement than by its inaccuracies. The jury sought more to penalize the New York Times
than to compensate for whatever vague harm was suffered by the
unnamed official who claimed to be identifiable by innuendo.
It seems reasonable to interpret the Constitution as prohibiting
this jury-imposed penalty. However, the means by which the
Supreme Court has chosen to achieve this limitation have created
problems and do not clearly serve the purpose of preventing such
penalties. First of all, the New York Times and Gertz rules protect too few types of speech because a jury might decide to penal131. See Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1440-48

(1962).

132. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
133. See Monaghan, FirstAmendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518, 529
(1970) (pointing out that the jury has been valuable in protecting the freedoms of
the majority but has never been particularly tolerant of dissent).
134. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
135. See note 78 supra.
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ize unpopular speech directed at anyone-not just at a public
official or at a public figure-if the speaker or the speech content
were to rub the jury the wrong way. At the same time, the New
York Times and Gertz rules protect too many kinds of speech because defamatory statements about unpopular public figures are
unlikely to incense a jury sufficiently to impose a penalty.
Perhaps public figures are the most likely beneficiaries of undue jury sympathy and consequently of penalties assessed by juries for essentially truthful speech. Juries and judges justifiably
might be assumed to be more prone to punish good faith criticism
of government officials rather than of private persons because
those who criticize the elected representatives of the majority are
also those who historically have been most likely to be the unpopular victims of governmental retaliation. However, public figures
are not necessarily the only likely beneficiaries of jury penalties.
If the speaker is a Nazi or a communist, the temptation to penalize him or her may be equally strong even if the victim of the alleged libel is an unknown private individual.
Conversely, if the target of an allegedly libelous story is a highly unpopular public figure, again such as a Nazi or a communist,
the newspaper publishing the story hardly needs enhanced constitutional protection against assessment of a penalty by an outraged jury. In my view, the New York Times rule unnecessarily
prevents the award of reasonable, frequently nominal, damages.
It also prevents the vindication of truth in all cases involving public officials (and by extension those involving public figures)
where the untruth is not malicious. This limitation is unnecessary
where the jury assesses no penalty for unpopular but truthful
speech. Moreover, it seems likely that in many cases involving
public officials or other public figures the jury is quite capable of
rendering a dispassionate and purely compensatory verdict.
The Court might better fulfill the constitutional purpose of preventing wrongly motivated, censorial jury verdicts by means
keyed more closely to the wrongful jury motivation itself. The
Court could prohibit punitive damages except where the libel is
shown to have been made maliciously of and concerning the
plaintiff-that is, the New York Times rule-but permit
compensatory damages (nominal damages plus out-of-pocket
losses) in all cases of negligence. The Court could also permit
damages for emotional distress in cases where the libel is malicious, as the New York Times case defines malice. Such a rule al-

most certainly would have limited the verdict in the New York
Times case to nominal damages, and by limiting damages it also
would reduce the incentive for nuisance suits against newspapers. Such a rule also would eliminate the need to draw the unmanageable distinction between public figures on the one hand
and private figures involved in issues of public interest on the
other. Yet, the rule would preserve the ability of all plaintiffs to
recover at least nominal damages for negligent falsehoods and
would give newspapers an incentive to settle and to publish retractions where negligent falsehoods occur. Had the Court focused more narrowly on the desirability of avoiding invidious
motivation in New York Times, it could have protected newspapers from penalties more effectively than it has while also safeguarding the valid interests of libel plaintiffs in establishing the
truth and recovering actual compensatory damages.
Commercial Speech
One of the Court's major changes of doctrine in the first amendment area during the past few years has come with regard to commercial speech. The change has come about by the re-doing of a
balancing approach, and the results are objectionable in terms of
constitutional doctrine.
In the past, commercial speech has received minimal constitutional protection. 3 6 From the point of view of legislative motivation, this approach seems eminently reasonable. Whatever the
interests are of consumers in receiving advertisements or of advertisers in informing the public about their products,137 it is undeniable that neither people offering goods or services for sale
nor their audience of potential consumers present generically the
kind of unpopular minority views likely to lead a legislative majority to silence them irrationally and with animus. Indeed, it is
the lack of animus that best explains the Court's refusal to hold
economic regulation unconstitutional on substantive due process
or equal protection grounds.138 Of course, it can be argued that
the Court's restraint in the areas of economic due process and
equal protection is itself misguided and that when the legislature
acts arbitrarily or prejudicially in the economic realm, the Court
should intervene and correct the problem. However, nonintervention has been justified persuasively by Professor McCloskey
136. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
137. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linrnark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
138. See generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commer
cial Speech and the Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971).
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on the ground that the Court's workload is too great to allow the
screening of large numbers of economic cases for evidence of occasional arbitrariness. 3 9 Another justification is that the examination of economic policy for arbitrariness frequently involves the
amassing of large volumes of evidence about economic data which
judges are ill-equipped to evaluate as experts and which do not
lend themselves to principled judgments capable of generalization from one case to the next.140 Also, even where prejudice exists in economic cases, its incidence against a given individual or
group is far less likely to be repetitive-and is far more likely to
be isolated and nonrecurring-than where the injustice results
from ingrained societal prejudice on the part of the legislature.141
Consequently, the sense of betrayal by government is also likely
to be less. For all these reasons, most observers of the Court
probably would agree that its retreat forty years ago from the economic arena was well-advised and should not be reversed.
The need for a judicial check on legislative bias or prejudice
does not require the Constitution to be read as providing a
greater check on legislative regulation of commercial speech than
on the underlying commercial transaction. At least in the case of
advertising drugs and lawyers' services, the regulation at worst
serves the narrow economic interests of the few and not the
prejudices of the majority. In the case of lawyer advertising, a
subject regulated by courts rather than legislatures, an attack
might be mounted more appropriately on doctrines isolating lawyers from legislative control rather than on the content of the existing regulation under the first amendment.142
Even assuming that the first amendment's protections should
apply to commercial speech, most commercial messages should
be prohibitable under the clear and present danger rule. Whenever goods or services are advertised, both an intention and an
imminent likelihood exist-in effect, a "clear and present danger"-that a sale will occur which the state has the right to prevent or to regulate if the transaction is dangerous or undesirable.
In recent commercial speech cases the Court has implied that to
139. McCloskey, Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court:An Exhumation
and Reburial,1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 61.

140. See id. at 51.
141. See note 43 supra.

142. See Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of
Law-A ProposedDelineation, 60 MmNN. L. REV. 783 (1976).
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be regulable, speech must create an imminent likelihood of an actually illegal act. However, there is no need for such a require43
ment so long as the state has the power to make an act illegal.1
There seems little doubt that the state constitutionally can regulate the price of, for example, prescription drugs or even legal
services if it so desires. Such regulation may or may not be undesirable, but it clearly seems constitutional. Given that basic power
to regulate, it seems appropriate in terms of the clear and present
danger doctrine to permit regulation of advertising designed to
generate regulable sales.144 By analogy, speech intended to incite
to riot and creating an imminent and reasonable likelihood of this
result is subject to regulation under the first amendment.
However, the Court recently has held that states can regulate
commercial advertising only if it solicits a transaction already illegal or if the advertising is false or misleading. 145 Consequently,
the Supreme Court appears to have imported into constitutional
law the myriad questions arising under '"printer's ink" statutes
regulating the accuracy of advertising, and the many consumer
protection statutes and regulations prohibiting and defining unfair and deceptive trade practices. One must question whether
this extension of judicial oversight is useful, much less necessary,
at a time when the Court has inveighed against the expansion of
federal court caseloads, resulting in a restriction of federal court
jurisdiction in areas affecting civil rights.'4 6
Perhaps the Court will limit commercial speech rights to factual
representations neither alleged to be seriously misleading nor involving harmful transactions.147 Most of the cases the Court has
143. Although the classic clear and present danger cases have involved advocacy of illegal acts, Justice Holmes' original formulation of the standard referred to
"substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States,

249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Granted that a state should not be able to outlaw advertising
of services such as abortion which it has no power to prohibit, see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), there nonetheless seems to be no persuasive reason why
a state should not be able to regulate speech creating a "clear and present danger"
of conduct the state constitutionally could but has not prohibited. Outlawing cigarette and liquor advertising constitutes one example of regulation which should
not need to hinge on whether the underlying transaction has been prohibited.
144. But see I TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrITUTONAL LAw 651-52 (1978).
145. Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
146. See generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation by police official does not constitute a deprivation of "liberty" or "property" under the fourteenth amendment); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dictum) (no Civil Rights
Act jurisdiction to enjoin police brutality); Burger, Chief Justice's Yearend Repor
1977, 64 A.B.A. J. 211 (1978).
147. But see Linnark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (in-

validating anti-blockbusting ordinance which forbade posting of "for sale" signs in
front of houses).
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decided to date fit into this narrow framework.1 48 However, even
if so restricted, the commercial speech doctrine has not been explained by the Court in terms of why even misguided economic
regulation needs to be reviewed by the courts under the Constitution.
Symbolic Speech
One of the frequently discussed applications of motivation
analysis is the draft card burning case, United States v.
O'Brien.149 Shortly after draft card burnings became a popular
way of protesting the Vietnamese War, Congress added to the Selective Service Act's prohibitions against alteration, forgery, or
nonpossession of draft cards an amendment prohibiting the
knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft card. O'Brien claimed
that the amendment was motivated by a desire to regulate speech
and that the government's negligible interest in possession of the
cards failed to justify such regulation. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that sufficiently important or substantial interests unrelated to regulation of expression justified
this "incidental" limitation on speech.
In terms of a balancing of interests, O'Brien again seems difficult to justify in other than conclusory terms. On the one hand,
the statute prevented an evocative method of protest. Moreover,
because the law already prohibited nonpossession of cards, the
amendment reached only those persons destroying other persons'
cards, destroying a duplicate, or perhaps partially burning but not
totally destroying their own cards. On the other hand, the government's stated need that registrants possess cards seems weak.
Simplifying the verification of registration, detecting delinquents,
determining availability for induction in case of emergency, informing the registrant of his draft board's address, and reminding
registrants to report changes in status all could be accomplished,
apparently, by "less burdensome alternatives." It is fairly clear
that the Court did not apply the kind of strict scrutiny in O'Brien
that is normally applied to laws regulating expressive activities.
148. Both Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), involved

truthful advertising of prices for legal services and for drugs, respectively. See
also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding constitutionally
protected the advertising and display of contraceptives).
149. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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The lack of strict scrutiny in O'Brien may be explained most
easily by reference to the statute's purpose. Both the timing of
the law and its legislative history confirm the common sense conclusion that Congress intended to attack draft card burning as a
form of protest. Congress enacted the law only after draft card
burning became a well-known form of protest, and speeches in
the Senate inveighed against "beatniks,"15 0
both the House and
"campus cults,"' 5 1 and "dissident persons" 152 destroying their
cards.
However, most of the rage directed against such activities appears not to have been directed at opposition to the war but at the
fact that the protestors had chosen an already illegal means to
protest. Draft card burning already violated the possession requirement in the regulations. In effect, Congress restated a prohibition already on the books in regulatory form, putting into
statutory form the proposition, "You shall not break the law in order to communicate your protest." The statute only tangentially
added substantive prohibitions to those already contained within
the regulation.
The Court might have acted more forthrightly by upholding the
statute on its facial purpose. O'Brien apparently did not argue
that the pre-existing regulation requiring possession of draft
cards was implemented for the purpose of suppressing speech. If
the possession required were not intended to suppress speech, it
would have been reasonable to hold that Congress acted with a
permissible purpose under the first amendment in banning protest violating existing, valid laws.
However, it might be argued that the passage of the statute
served little real purpose other than to symbolize congressional
ire because the act in question was already forbidden by the regulations and therefore was subject to statutory penalties. It also
might be argued that the statute prevented the Selective Service
System from legitimating draft card burnings by changing its possession requirement for no reason other than to prevent such activity as a form of expression. Finally, it could be argued that to
the extent the statute enlarged the prior prohibition by penalizing
the burning of other people's cards or of duplicates, the statute
created a new substantive prohibition for the primary purpose of
restraining speech.
Nonetheless, it seems defensible to argue that it is not an ilegitimate purpose under the first amendment for Congress to state
150. 111 CONG. REC. 19,871 (1965).
151. Id
152. S. REP. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).

1004

[voL. 15: 953, 1978]

FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that the pre-existing regulation served some useful purpose, that
the policies served by the regulation warranted incorporation and
expansion in the statute, and that a violation of the policies underlying the regulation should be punished even if the violation
was a defiant act undertaken as speech. Had Congress stated this
purpose in the Act's preamble, the Court probably would not have
voted differently. It is, after all, a cardinal first amendment tenet
that Congress may prohibit words creating a clear and present
danger of causing violation of a law not itself aimed at regulating
the content of speech. That the prohibition reaches acts, not
words, which themselves violate such a law makes the case
stronger, not weaker.
Had the Court used this analysis, it could have held that the
draft card burning law was aimed at regulating "speech" and not
merely at facilitating the smooth functioning of the Selective
Service registration process, as Professor Ely has suggested. 5 3
However, the Court also could have recognized that the regulation of speech in question was permissible in light of first amendment concerns. I thus disagree with Professor Ely's analysis of
O'Brien that "motivation is irrelevant" to the outcome of the case
because the law rationally related to an acceptable goal other
than regulation of speech. 5 4
In other "symbolic speech" cases the laws on their faces regulated the use of symbols. These cases include Tinker v. Des
Moines School Distriet,155 where the Court struck down a regulation banning the wearing of black arm bands in school to protest
the Vietnamese War, and a trilogy of flag desecration cases where
the Court struck down laws banning defacement, destruction, mutilation, or casting of contempt upon the American flag.156 The
harm flowed either from the content of the communication itself,
as in Tinker, or from interference with a particular symbolic
message contained in the American flag. Professor Ely finds both
situations to be cases in which the content of speech is regulated
to prevent harms related to the message and hence subject to

153. Ely, FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1498-99 (1975).
154. Ely, supra note 1, at 1339.
155. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
156. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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scrutiny under the clear and present danger test.157 In all these
cases, one can state in different language that the laws were motivated by the invidious desire to censor unpopular political expression and that no clear and present danger justified doing so.
OverbroadLaws and Bills of Attainder
The Court regularly has invalidated laws disqualifying people
from government employment or attaching other civil burdens to
people with certain political affiliations. Laws banning members
of subversive organizations from government jobs,158 union offices,159 or bar membershipl 60 also have been held unconstitu-

tional. Usually, as a balancing matter, the reasons for holding
such laws unconstitutional are largely conclusory. Proving membership in a subversive organization is doubtless much easier
than proving an individual's role in the organization, and barring
present or past members of such organizations from work in defense plants,161 for example, might constitute a valid method of
preventing sabotage or theft of defense secrets. On the other side
of the balance, the statutory exclusion from a defense plant job
arguably causes little burden on the freedom of association where
such jobs constitute only one percent of the job openings avail2
able to the plaintiff.16

In analyzing the motivation or purpose of the statute, the same
arguments can be made. Preventing sabotage is a compelling
state interest. This interest, rather than punishment or inhibition
of membership in subversive organizations, can be argued to motivate the statute. Nonetheless, the justification for invalidating
the statute again can be made in prophylactic terms. Many people
join subversive organizations without knowing the organizations'
intent or without acting to further the organizations' goals. Such
people are not demonstrably dangerous and a fortiori should not
be punished.163 The Court should reason that a punitive, malevo157. Ely, FlagDesecratiornA Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Bal.
ancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HAnv. L. REV. 1482, 1502-08 (1975).
158. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
159. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). But see American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
160. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
161. United States v. RobeL, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
162. Id. at 287 (White, J., dissenting).
163. See Emerson, supra note 69, at 942:
[U] se of qualifications [for government employment] based upon exercise of the right of free expression is wholly incompatible with a system of
free expression, and ... the other social interests at stake can be adequately protected by prohibition of the conduct rather than the expression. Whether actually intended or not, the imposition of such
qualifications operates as a penalty-a severe and pervasive one-upon
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lent desire to stigmatize persons espousing politically unpopular
points of view, rather than a good faith desire to prevent subversion of the national defense, might well motivate exclusion of
such persons from public employment. In other words, the process by which Congress decided to exclude such persons from
public jobs is suspect under the first amendment, and in the absence of any way to determine the purity of congressional motives, the Court should require, as a prophylactic measure, that
persons be excluded only if they otherwise could be punished because they knowingly and intentionally furthered a subversive organization's purpose and if the particular job involves national
security interests. Moreover, the Court's holdings serve not only
to prevent wrongly motivated enactment of such laws, but
wrongly motivated enforcement as well.
All the above is not to deny that a balancing of values takes
place in a discussion of legislative motivation or purpose. In recognizing the punitive potential of public-job denials, the Court
necessarily must consider the danger that some known subversives will effectively conceal their true role in the organization
and hence effectively be able to infiltrate defense plants or
schools. This possibility is the cost of a prophylactic rule, just as
in libel cases the cost is represented by permitting negligent defamation of public figures. A purpose analysis does not require the
Court to measure the impact of the discrimination on the individual; the Court could decide generically that such laws if unjustified are bad because they are punitive. There would be no need to
consider whether public jobs represent one percent of the total
number of jobs available in industry, as in defense plants, or a figure much nearer one hundred percent, as in bar membership or
in school teaching. Moreover, it may be more feasible to determine the difficulty of holding individual hearings to determine
the role of the individual in the organization and the difficulties
(if any) of securing testimony in light of the fifth amendment.
The inquiry, in other words, is narrowed somewhat to a considerfree expression. The administration of such restrictions-involving searching without limits or logic into every phase of a person's beliefs, opinions
and associations; the imputation to individuals of the views of others with
whom he associates; the creation of a far-reaching apparatus of investigation and enforcement; the stimulation of an atmosphere of fear and hysteria-is particularly destructive. The use of beliefs, opinions and
associations as a guide to future improper conduct, where relevant at all,
is of minimal value. Employment of such qualifications, even on a limited
scale, seriously "abridges" freedom of expression.
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ation of the additional costs of requiring a "less burdensome alternative." This inquiry forecloses the legislature's ability to
impose punitive effects purposefully by barring individuals who
lack evil intent.
The Court also has stricken, as overbroad under the first
amendment, laws involving prohibitions against language which
is "offensive," "opprobrious," "profane," and the like.164 The
Court's announced rationale is that such definitions include language which in no sense constitutes "fighting words" or creates
an imminent danger of physical conflict or other harm. Moreover,
such statutes chill permissible expression because people cannot
ascertain the borderline between protected and unprotected
speech. Hence, the Court has ruled, the state may ban such language only when it has "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
65
addressed."1
Again, as a balancing matter, it is not entirely clear why the
Court should bother to protect the individual who uses the term
"motherfucker" indiscriminately (but not toward any particular
individual present who is likely to retaliate) at a PTA meeting,166
or the individual at a hockey game who consistently directs from
a safe distance gross obscenities toward the referee or the opposing team. In terms of the speech the first amendment is designed
to protect, the admitted emotive or emetic value of such language
surely must be balanced against a societal interest in group morality, good taste, or parental desire to shield children from an
early education in invective language. Surely public profanity is a
far cry from the kind of language necessary to political dialogue
that Meiklejohn167 and others have identified as the central value
protected by the free speech clause.
The Court's position might be explained better in terms of the
need for a prophylactic rule preventing invidiously motivated governmental action against identifiable political and social minorities. The central problem with banning obscenity at the PTA
meeting or the hockey game is that it is nearly impossible to formulate a prohibition reaching such expression while preventing
the government from banning as "offensive," "Vituperative," or
"profane" any extreme castigation of leading politicans or
164.15 See,
e.g.,Chaplinsky
Gooding v.
405 U.S. 518
(1972);
U.S.
(1971);
v. Wilson,
New Hampshire,
315 U.S.
568Cohen
(1942). v. California, 403
165. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (quoting State v. Chaplin.
sky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 320-21, 18 A.2d 754, 758, 762 (1941)).
166. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
167. A. MEnuLzjOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GovERNzwNT

(1960).
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majoritarian religions through terms such as "scum" or "damned
liars." The potential for selective enforcement of such a rule
8
against politically unpopular groups and speakers is immense.16
The first amendment overbreadth cases in the 1960's revealed enforcement of vague loitering and fighting words statutes against
unpopular civil rights demonstrators in the South1 6 9 and
Vietnamese War protestors around the country.I7 0 No good way
exists to distinguish language addressed at "motherfuckers" on
the schoolboard at a PTA meeting from language nearly as vigorous directed at the President during a war protest rally.
Again, by focusing on the need for a prophylactic rule guarding
against delegation to police and to prosecutors of the power to
discriminate against persons publicly espousing unpopular
causes, the Court could avoid the need to defend the dubious
"value" of expletives uttered in public places for whatever cause.
Instead, it could more forthrightly recognize that it will require
toleration of certain offensive speech of low value and some arguable harm in order to prevent all-inclusive statutes from accomplishing purposes the first amendment is primarily designed to
forbid-namely, the prosecution of people for the expression of
opinions which are politically or religiously highly unpopular but
are not demonstrably harmful in any other sense.
Public Forums
There have been times, as Professor Ely observes, when the
Court has stricken statutes as unconstitutional despite the fact
that they have neither the purpose nor the function of regulating
the content of speech.l7 ' Laws forbidding distribution of handbills
on public sidewalks are a leading example.17 2 Professor Ely suggests that this is an instance where balancing serves a valid function-weighing the state's interest in avoiding litter against the
168. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 136-37 (the Court will not act solely on the
effects of a facially valid statute).

169. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,

372 U.S. 229 (1963).
170. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
171. Ely, FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1486-87 (1975).
172. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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first amendment interest in free speech. 7 3 In different language,
the Court is evaluating the reasonablenessof regulating the time,
place, and manner of speech, rather than its content.
At the same time, however, one must recognize that handbilling
and street corner meetings are more frequently the communications media of dissident political interests, small religious groups,
and out-of-office politicians than of established and influential
government officials and political parties.174 Eliminating the ability to distribute leaflets on public sidewalks would have substantially hurt the anti-war protestors of the 1960's but would not have
hurt the Pentagon. Moreover, if an anti-litter ordinance forbidding
handbills were not motivated by actual animus toward the points
of view frequently expressed in handbills, it at least would be enacted-and perhaps selectively enforced-with an insouciance
created by the feeling that these points of view are generally unwanted or unappreciated by their audiences and that the leafletting constitutes at best a nuisance of no practical value.175
Again, it is obvious that the judgment that leafletting should be
constitutionally protected despite the state interest in preventing
litter involves some sort of balancing of these interests. However,
balancing where motivation is a prime consideration focuses not
on the abstract values of free speech versus litter prevention but
rather focuses on the need for a prophylactic rule preventing discrimination against unpopular or "unimportant" points of view.
The creation of a prophylactic rule against anti-litter ordinances
involves an essentially arbitrary judgment that the fear of discrimination justifies either a certain amount of litter or the cost to
the state of removing it. However, the concern for preventing discriminatory motivation accomplishes two things the Court's normal balancing process does not accomplish. First, it acknowledges
forthrightly that no scientific "balance" is possible, but that a
rule, however arbitrary, is necessary precisely because of the
Court's inability to make fine determinations of motivation in individual cases where leafletters are arrested. Second, the articulation of a preventive rule, as opposed to balancing, states the
fundamental concern justifying whatever arbitrariness inheres in
the rule's selection-namely, a concern about discriminatory action against unpopular speakers or points of view. Such an articulation contains a built-in constitutional justification for judicial
173. Ely, FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1486-87 (1975).
174. This point also has been made by Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 30, and perhaps more directly by
Karst, supra note 106, at 35-43.
175. See Karst, supra note 106, at 40-42.
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intervention, however arbitrary. This justification is the need to
prevent prejudiced action by government officials.
A similar process of legal reasoning applies to laws the Court
has upheld which prohibited demonstrations close to courthouses17 6 or on jailhouse grounds. 7 7 A simple explanation is that
a balancing test was used and that the interest in courthouse serenity and jailhouse security outweighed the interest in speech.
In terms of motivation or purpose, one can make a further observation: Even if the legislature or the local government board had
not found the minority viewpoints valueless nuisances at best, the
interest in protecting courthouses and jail houses is so strong that
the same result would have been compelled. In this sense, the
Court behaves much like any court faced with an administrative
agency decision resting on an improper factor. Error may be held
harmless in light of the compelling nature of other evidence supporting the decisions. 7 8
RIGHTs OF PRIVACY: ABORTION FUNDING, LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE,
AND

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE ACTION AND
INACTION

Even when faced with legislation apparently motivated by
prejudice, the Court at times has held that a law is not unconsti-

tutional if it resembles state passivity or inaction rather than affirmatively restricts individual rights. A case decided during the

1977 Term illustrates this approach and its attendant problems.
In Maher v. Roe,179 the Court held that the constitutional right
to privacy entitling a woman and her physician to make an abortion decision during the first two trimesters of pregnancy without
state interference does not invalidate a state's refusal to fund
elective abortions under its Medicaid program. The Court held
that the Constitution requires only that the state not create an
"unduly burdensome interference with [a woman's] freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy"180 presumably either
by prohibiting the decision outright or by delegating a veto right
to others. Alternatively, the state is permitted "to make a value
176. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
177. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

178. See text accompanying notes 250-56 infra.
179. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

180. Id. at 474.
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judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.181
In light of previous holdings that the state can neither prohibit
abortions,182 require special facilities or medical consultation for
abortions, 8 3 nor require parental or spousal consent, 84 the decision that states may except abortions from other kinds of medical
treatment offered under Medicaid seems anomalous. Distinguishing abortion from other medical treatment to which an indigent
woman is entitled at state expense under the Medicaid program
and disallowing it indeed may constitute an unduly burdensome
interference with her freedom of choice. It even might interfere to
the point of making such a choice impossible. Concern that abortions might be made more difficult-albeit more safe than other
operations--earlier led the Court to invalidate state requirements
that abortions be performed only after consultation with additional doctors or in special hospitals or other facilities. 185 Yet, in
Maher, the Court has acknowledged that discriminating against
abortions by singling them out for denial of funding is a permissible state goal.
The Court explained that refusal to fund abortions does not penalize the right to abort because the refusal to fund is not an "interference"; by contrast, it is simply an "encouragement" of
alternative activity, namely childbearing. 86 Paraphrased in language perhaps archaic, the Court seems to be saying that the
funding refusal interferes with no right of the plaintiff, but only
with a privilege that the state can withhold at will.187 Alternatively, one might assert that because state funding of medical
treatment is discretionary with the state and because no vested
right to it exists, the decision not to fund abortions is not state ac88
tion at all, but rather state inaction.
This rationale for the Court's different treatment of motivation
correlates significantly with other cases which have raised similar
questions about the relevance of legislative motivation. The Court
181. Id,
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
184. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
185. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
186. 432 U.S. at 475.
187. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
188. Professor Emerson makes a similar observation in Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 918 (1963), when he observes that the question whether Congress (or a state) has made a law abridging
first amendment freedom involves questions of both state action and governmental purpose to regulate constitutionally protected authority, as opposed to some
other purpose.
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has upheld laws, apparently motivated by the desire to aid
religious education, permitting students to leave school during
school hours to obtain religious education at a nearby church.189
Equivalent education under the school's own roof, however, is unconstitutional.190 The difference in policy seems minimal; rather,
the difference appears to be a conceptual one between a law actively involving the state in aiding religious education and a law
merely permitting private individuals to pursue religious education.
The Court also has held in the area of establishment of religion
that although the state may not prohibit private religious education of students,191 the state also may not affirmatively fund such
education' 92 -again drawing a line between active assistance to
religion and passive tolerance of private activity.
The Court similarly has upheld against equal protection
charges states' refusals to fund given activities or programs in
other contexts. For example, Geduldig v. Aiello193 upheld against
sex discrimination charges California's refusal to fund pregnancy
leaves as part of an employees' disability insurance program.
Even so, it held that the state may not affirmatively "penalize"
women by discharging them from employment because of pregnancy. 9 4 Moreover, when in Palmer v. Thompson'95 the City of
Jackson closed its public swimming pools rather than have them
integrated, the Court denied that any affirmative act designed to
penalize integration or to enforce segregation had occurred. Evidently, as argued more fully below, the closing of the pools represented state "inaction" more than state "action."
These cases create an uneasy feeling that the Court's distinctions are related more to a concept-state action versus state inaction-than to a policy. If the state declines to fund abortions, a
poor woman may be deprived of one as effectively as if abortions
were outlawed. By releasing children from public school so that
they may pursue religious education next door, the state is using
its compelled attendance laws to aid religious education and is
189. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
190. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
191. The Court makes this point in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) (citing

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
192. E.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
193. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
194. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
195. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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creating as great a risk of religious coercion as would occur if the
classes were held in the school building itself. In terms of the
law's impact, therefore, the distinction may lack substance.
The same charge can be made in terms of the sense of discrimination the law produces. If a state disability insurance plan declines to fund pregnancy leaves, or if Medicaid programs decline
to fund abortions, one is strongly led to suspect that the law was
motivated by prejudice against women or against abortions. Likewise, a released-time program facilitating religious education-or
for that matter a law permitting education requirements to be
met entirely in private (including religious) schools--quite likely
is motivated by a desire to aid religion.
Nonetheless, the conceptual distinction between state action
and state inaction makes basic sense-although not of a nature
which ultimately justifies the decision in Maker. The justifications for the doctrine are essentially two-fold. First, as a pragmatic, evidentiary matter, it is frequently difficult to prove
invidious motivation in cases of state inaction because there usually exist many alternative explanations for the inaction. Second,
under the "state action" notion that the Constitution limits only
governmental and not private action, the government constitutionally should not be compelled either to limit or to enable private action of certain kinds.
The argument that motivation is more difficult to determine in
cases in which the state does nothing seems generally persuasive,
although of course it does not dispose of cases where the motivation is admitted or otherwise known. If a city were to refuse to rezone land to accommodate a high-density housing development
which would include a large minority population, 9 6 it would be
difficult to render a conclusion of invidious motivation because
there would be many alternative explanations for the failure to
act. Preservation of a suburban lifestyle, fear of enhanced traffic
problems and school costs, and the need for enlarged sewage disposal facilities all could justify the failure to rezone. Consequently, absent an admission of invidious intent, such intent can
seldom be responsibly inferred by the Court.197 Similarly, the failure to fund an entire Medicaid program seldom can be presumed
to result from the motivational fear that the program might be required to fund abortions, which the state lawmakers might oppose on moral grounds.
196. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
197. The Court indicates that a variety of information may, however, serve to indicate that these alternative explanations are unconvincing. See note 23 supra.
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If a government body declines to fund abortions, pregnancy
leaves, or swimming pools, it frequently has available the excuse
that these benefits cost money and that financial motives controlled the decision. This excuse may be suspect-but it is seldom
demonstrably specious where the funding denial relates to services and not to groups of people. By contrast, the rationale that
the government cannot afford a given service is unavailable if
Medicaid, for example, is denied to specific groups like blacks or
women who had previously obtained abortions. The only reason
for eliminating funding to these groups would be that such groups
are deemed less worthy of having their needs met than other
groups in the society: in a word, prejudice.
Additional cases can be conceived where the Court could not legitimately conclude that the lawmakers were properly motivated
simply because they -offered funding concerns as an excuse for
denying certain services. Had the City of Jackson operated swimming pools for years at a profit, its decision to save money immediately after an integration order might well have been totally
unconvincing. Likewise, where it can be shown that childbirth
costs exceed abortion costs (quite apart from costs of welfare
support for the child after birth), a court could legitimately conclude that financial savings did not underlie the decision to refuse
funding abortions.
Where such a conclusion is reached--or where the lawmaker
admits prejudice against integration or abortions-the distinction
between action and inaction still may be relevant for a different
reason. Generally, the Constitution does not prevent the government from tolerating activity it may not further or from failing to
propagate activity it may not prohibit.198 As the school integration
cases abundantly indicate, the government is generally under no
constitutional obligation to foster integration except as a remedy
for past de jure discrimination.199 A suburban school district that
has never engaged in de jure discrimination as the Court defines
it and which has forthrightly declined to enter into a bussing contract with an inner-city school on grounds that it simply did not
want to integrate would apparently not violate the Constitution as
the Court presently construes it, simply because integration is not
an affirmative duty of the state.
198. Cf. Fiss, supra note 40, at 168-70 (arguing that the difficulty of fashioning
an effective remedy often results in inaction by the courts).
199. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Brest, supra note 28, at 31-43.
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Such an interpretation of the Constitution of course is not inevitable, and respected scholars have challenged it.200 At the same
time, it is far from indefensible. The distinction seems to be based
ultimately on the notion that the Constitution is designed to prevent the state from enforcing segregation while leaving individuals free within certain limits to segregate themselves privately by
race if they so desire. Authorities differ over where "state action"
should end and where the private enclave of associational privacy
should begin, 201 but most would agree that the line exists somewhere. If the line does exist, it then would be anomalous to argue
that the Constitution requires the state to eliminate private discrimination within the area of associational privacy by affirmative
legislation banning discrimination.
Concerning requirements of state funding, as Professor
Michelman has stated, "the negative right not to be officially subjected to unfavorable treatment by reason of poverty does not encompass the positive right to be educated at public expense"
under conventional equal protection doctrine. 2 02 Such a requirement effectively would eliminate whatever constitutional line exists between state action and private action in the area of
invidious discrimination. If some notion of affirmative state duty
either to provide services or to prevent private discrimination is
to exist, this duty must grow out of some concept other than that
of invidious denial of equal protection-a concept similar to that
2 03
of "minimum protection" as discussed by Professor Michelman.
Again, my purpose here is not to pinpoint the location of the line
between state action and private action-the private area of association which is immune from state action may be as small as
one's living room or as large as one's school district-but rather to
argue that the line does exist, and probably should.
It also seems relevant to observe that the boundaries of state
action the Constitution condemns, and the private action it tolerates, may vary from one area of the Constitution to another.
Where a state-owned building leased space to a restaurant that
engaged in racial discrimination, the Court held that state action
was involved in the relationship and that, by inference, the state
wrongly furthered the private action by becoming financially in200. See Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness:For Groups?, 69 Am.POL SCL REV. 607
(1975). But see Fiss, supra note 40, at 168-70.
201. See, e.g., Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. RE V. 473 (1962) (suggesting a zone of associational privacy as a limitation on
the concept of state action).
202. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HAnv. L REv. 7, 56 (1969).
203. Id. at 35-39.
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volved with the restaurant. 20 4 In effect, the state acted affirmatively, and wrongly, in aiding racial discrimination by a private
party. It is doubtful that a similar result would be reached, however, if the state-owned building leased its premises to the
YMCA, which conducted religious services in its space. Although
the state is clearly prohibited under the establishment clause
from actively furthering religious belief, the Court probably would
hold that the state can more closely assist or relate to religious
groups than to racially discriminatory groups without engaging in
constitutionally impermissible state action.
No one, to my knowledge, has ever suggested that the state action doctrine is generally capable of uniform--or even very coherent-policy-oriented doctrinal elaboration. Even so, few people
would argue that the doctrine need not exist. The doctrine seems
to go far toward explaining the concerns underlying the abortion
funding decision as well as some of the other cases alluded to
above. In Maher v. Roe, the Court takes non-funding of abortion
as a zero point on the scale between discouragement and encouragement of abortion. By permitting private religious education to
exist but not funding it, the state likewise achieves neutrality between encouraging and discouraging religion.
However, acknowledging the general utility of a distinction between state action and state inaction does not salvage the Court's
decision in Maher v. Roe. The Court's assumption that zero funding equates with state inaction is seriously questionable. The
state had acted by funding nearly all the medical needs an indigent person might incur, but it excepted abortion from this list.
There are problems not only in Maher but generally with this
conceptually neat conclusion that normalcy, neutrality, or equal
treatment always equates with zero funding. There are many areas where the state provides benefits equally to nearly all citizens
for nearly all services and where the denial of funding would represent hostility rather than neutrality. For example, in the area of
religion, it is doubtful that the Court would (or should) regard as
"neutral" a policy whereby the state provides police and fire protection to all property owners except churches. Likewise, although the state has no constitutional obligation to enhance the
education or the scholarship of racial minority group members, no
one would contend that the state can refuse scholarships avail204. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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able to the rest of the population to black college students. In effect, one is brought back to all the problems of the old rightprivilege distinction. 20 5 The state has no obligation to furnish jobs;
they are a privilege, not a right. However, this does not mean
that someone can be denied a job as a policeman for invidious
reasons, such as those relating to race, speech, or political associo6
ation.2
The essential problem is that the distinction between invidious
state action and permissible state inaction demands some notion
of a status quo. It is permissible for the state not to afford a black
person a job or an integrated education, assuming that the state
has never either afforded jobs to most other people in the population or intruded into the business of moving students across
school district lines. Once the state starts providing these opportunities to the general public, and the black person is suddenly
excluded from the benefits, a constitutional problem surely results. The state has no duty to fund political speech (as opposed
to prohibiting it), but once it decides to fund political speech by
Republicans it can scarcely refuse to fund speeches by Democrats
as well.
Similarly, in Griffin v. County School Board,207 the Court held
that the county could not close its public school system in order
to avoid integration and said that the closing instead constituted a
delegation of the essentially governmental function to the private
schools. However, public funding of the private segregated
schools was springing up, and more than any other this fact explains the conclusion that the state 'affirmatively discriminated-not by failing to fund public schools but by
supporting segregated private institutions while failing to support
integrated public schools. 208 In other words, although the state
has no duty to depart from the status quo to aid religion, minority
racial groups, or political speakers, it cannot depart from the status quo to harm them. By no means does the status quo always
consist of zero funding.
The problem in Maher v. Roe, therefore, boils down to this: The
status quo in Medicaid is not zero funding, but funding nearly all
medical costs, including childbirth, incurred by poor people.
205. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HInv. L, REV. 1439 (1968).
206. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) ("We need not pause to
consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to
say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.").
207. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
208. The Court so states in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1971).
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There clearly was a departure from the status quo-and consequently an affirmative burdening-of poor people wanting abortions. The only remaining question is whether this burdening was
invidious. Given the preferred position the Court has given the
abortion right in Roe v. Wade and its progeny,209 it seems difficult
to understand why any such burdening is not automatically suspect of being invidious. One major caveat is that the Supreme
Court has never satisfactorily explained (for reasons too involved
to detail here) why there should be a constitutional right to an
abortion in the first place. It is not at all clear that there should be
such a right.210 However, given that such a right exists and that
the state can neither require more stringent health safeguards for
abortion patients than for other patients 2 n nor require spousal or
in most cases parental consent to abortions,.22 the excision for
nonfiscal reasons of abortion funding from the otherwise nearly
plenary Medicaid program appears to be constitutionally fallible.
A moral judgment of the state wrongfully displaces the moral
judgment of the woman and the doctor who jointly opt for abor13

tion.2
Various other constitutional areas exist where a distinction is
relevant between decisions not to provide services and decisions
to "penalize" a class of persons or rights. Suppose a municipal

theater refuses to permit a play to be presented on the ground
that it is obscene, or a public library decides not to acquire a

given book for the same reason. Is a decision that would be unconstitutional as censorship if the state actively were to prohibit
possession of such a book or viewing of such a play nonetheless
permissible because the state is merely refusing to fund or to
supply the book or the play, which it need not do in the first
place? In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,214 the Court
responded that the denial of use of a municipal theater to a theatrical company on the ground that its play was obscene indeed vio-

lated the first amendment. The Court gave no weight to the
209. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973).

210. For an exposition of some of the problems surrounding the abortion decisions, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
211. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
212. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
213. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreword Toward a Model of
Roles in the Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARv.L. REV. 1 (1973).
214. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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possible argument that the state was not suppressing speech but
was merely failing to aid it, holding instead that the theater's denial constituted a penalty based on the content of the speech.
The Court's conclusion in Conrad seems justifiable, though it
might be dubious on the facts of most other cases because the
censorial motivation would be difficult to establish. Municipal
theaters are a scarce resource, more analogous to Lincoln Center
than to the public sidewalk, and those who direct the theaters
have wide discretion to reject as well as to accept plays to be produced. Similar judgments, for example, also are made by the
boards of public libraries: Because not all books can be afforded,
many must be rejected. In general, both the theater and the library may legitimately rely on rather vague, discretionary criteria
for their decisions: for example, literary worth and popular demand.
However, in Conrad the city fathers admitted that their rejection of Hair was not based on its lack of literary worth (which
could have covered a multitude of sins, including something such
as "tasteless sexuality"), but instead designated the play "obscene." The Court apparently viewed the constitutional problem
of refusing for such reasons to sponsor a play to be no less substantial than the problem of censoring a privately produced play
for similar reasons; any distinction between state action and state
inaction did not concern the Court, and it should not have. The
state had acted by excluding the play from the generally available theater and had further declined to rely on justifications arguably within its proper discretion, including the idea that the
play was unfit for juveniles and that the theater should be maintained for general audiences. Rather, the city made the judgment
that the play was not fit for the adult public to see, and this is the
same kind of constitutionally prohibited motivation the state has
when it censors the private purchase or sale of books, films, or
plays. 2 15
All the above does not mean that library and theater boards do
not make permissible moral choices. Discretionary notions of literary worth at least mask, and perhaps necessarily include, some
judgment about the way sexuality and other human relationships
are portrayed, or the way political activities are advocated.
Clearly, a city has discretion to shield juveniles and unconsenting
adults from certain material that is judged acceptable only for
215. Apparently for similar reasons, the Court held that a city could not prevent
alleged communists from holding meetings on public streets and in public parks.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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mature, consenting adult audiences. 216 Had the city in Conrad
not confessed to censorial motivation, its action probably would
have been unchallengeable. The decision as it emerged seems
correct and fundamentally at odds with Maher's conclusion that
even an invidious motivation is permissible if the state merely
singles out a given production or activity for denial of state funding or state support.
In many ways the abortion funding case also raises issues similar to those presented in Palmer v. Thompson,217 the swimming
pool case. Professor Brest views the city's decision in the latter
case as based on an admitted desire to avoid integration and of
merely conjectural justification in terms of avoiding violence or
economic loss. Hence, Professor Brest believes the decision incorrect and would permit closing the pools only if violence and serious loss had actually occurred and could not have been prevented
in any other practical way 8
However, the Court's position can be justified in a way that the
Court did not use. Even had the motivation of the city council
consisted solely of the desire not to encourage association between blacks and whites, and not of a fear of violence or of economic loss, this fact alone would not have required reversal of the
case. The Court could have found lack of state action where the
city simply failed to operate the pools. 219 It seems clear that the
city would not have been required to create a swimming program
for the purpose of fostering racially integrated social contacts
among its citizens. It can be argued persuasively that there
should be no greater requirement to operate swimming pools for
this purpose simply because pools had been operated in the past
on a segregated basis. If one were to argue contrarily that the city
was departing from a status quo for invidious racial reasons, the
departure presumably would consist not in the fact that the city
was continuing to fund segregated programs for whites while dis216. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (applying a rational relation

test to speech not protected by the first amendment).
217. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
218. An Approach, supra note 2, at 131-33.

219. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976), the Court states of Palmer
that "the legitimate purposes of the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations." This language can support the

interpretation that even if the council confessed its dislike of integration, the deci-

sion not to fund recreational facilities would be a valid purpose justifying the ordinance.
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continuing programs in which blacks could also participate, but
rather as deriving from the historical tradition of operating swimming pools. Yet, if the end point of the law is nondiscriminatory,
it seems rigid and arbitrary to say that any movement away from
a past system is unconstitutional.
Admittedly, the Court has vacillated on this point. The Court
has justified property tax exemptions for religious organizations
not only on the ground that such exemptions are available to nonprofit groups generally but also on the ground that the historical
status quo has been to exempt religious groups from taxation.220
By contrast, the Court has condemined attempts to grant tax exemptions as well as tuition grants to those wanting to send their
children to private (including religious) schools despite the fact
that the state funds secular education. 221 Likewise, the Court apparently considers it permissible to grant educational funds to
most colleges and universities while excepting seminaries. 2 22 The
grounds for these latter decisions can be best explained by the
view that the historical status quo has been to withhold tuition
benefits or other aid for such schools. Despite the formal equality
of the result, the move away from the historical status quo would
serve primarily to benefit religion. It seems perfectly even-handed
to give each parent a tax exemption reflecting money that could
be spent on either public education, private nonsectarian education, or private religious education. That the Court has condemned such an approach, unlike the rendition of fire and police
benefits or tax exemption to churches along with other nonprofit
organizations, suggests that the Court views the movement away
from the historical status quo as an affirmative movement toward
the benefit of religion.
Maher v. Roe can also be viewed as a case involving a historical
status quo, namely, the non-funding of abortions. It is at least possible that the Court would have been less friendly to this position
had the law originally funded all elective surgery and the legislators then had amended the law to eliminate abortion funding.
However, this hypothetical approach seems questionable and at
odds with other Supreme Court cases, including Palmer v.
Thompson. Such an approach freezes society into a status quo
which may itself be deceptive because society itself is changing.
For example, individuals are now far less able to afford quality
private education than they were previously. In the abortion context, it is doubtful that the Court would or should say that one
220. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
221. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
222. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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state may not discontinue all its Medicaid programs to avoid
funding abortions while another state may legitimately decline to
establish such a program for the same reason. If a municipal theater were required to host musicals which the town fathers
deemed offensive, such as Hair, it does not follow that the city
should be required to continue operating the theater at all. Establishing a new theater should not be required where a city previously had none even if the only motivation for not having a
theater is the problem of censorship.
A contrary approach would have at least three drawbacks. First,
it would establish an essentially arbitrary difference between
communities that have established a given program or "status
quo" and those that have not. Second, it would freeze the community that has established the status quo into a decision to advance
integration or the arts that could not be reversed despite the fact
that the initial decision to do so was discretionary. Third, it would
be misleading because in any event motivation can frequently be
disguised to avoid the Court's objections. In terms of this third
problem, a city wishing to close its swimming pools or municipal
theater, or a state wishing to discontinue its Medicaid program,
could in most cases cite fiscal reasons as a way of justifying the
decision as nondiscriminatory. Perhaps doing so serves some purpose in itself; at least such a disguised decision reduces from certainty to suspicion the degree of stigma that a decision motivated
by prejudice against blacks, abortion patients, or "offensive" theater pieces would otherwise convey. However, such benefits seem
inadequate to justify freezing the historical status quo for indefinite periods.
One final context for the distinction between state action and
inaction, and for the relevance of motivation, is Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.22 3 In this
case, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove a discriminatory racial intent when the city refused to rezone from single-family housing to accommodate multi-family development
with a significantly higher population of minority racial groups.
The Court further observed that a showing of discriminatory intent would render the city's inaction unconstitutional, although
even then the city could still prevail by
223. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the
complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the
injury complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged decision. 224

Here again the Court appears to treat the role of discriminatory
intent differently than in the abortion funding case. In effect, it
states that if a purpose of avoiding integration were shown to
have controlled the decision in the zoning context, the result
would be unconstitutional, whereas a desire not to encourage
abortion is not unconstitutional. In effect, failure to rezone is not
a passive, discretionary act, whereas failure to fund abortion or
swimming pools is passive and discretionary. The Court does not
explain this distinction. Perhaps it lies in the fact that regulatory
laws, like zoning, are essentially prohibitory of private activity. In
addition, they affirmatively segregate and do not merely fail to
encourage integration if the requisite intent is shown. The old, unchanged zoning law thus always constitutes state action. Yet it is
also relevant that the Court takes the position that where a board
fails to change a zoning law from low to high density when a lowincome housing project is anticipated, invidious intent apparently
will rarely be demonstrable. 225 In essence, the Court could effectively state that the town is under a greater duty to avoid applying an existing, racially neutral law to achieve segregration than it
is to operate swimming pools to achieve integration. Where there
is no motive to retain the racially neutral law except the avoidance of integration, its retention would presumably be unconstitutional. Had the administrators admitted a racially oriented motive
for failing to rezone in Arlington, the decision would have been
remanded for further support on non-racial grounds. But arguably
in Palmer,and certainly in Maher, the admission of a policy oriented respectively to race or abortion would not have invalidated
the decision. With regard to Maher, at least, this difference seems
highly dubious.
A BRIEF COMMENT ON OTHER CRICS' VIEWS OF LEGISLATIVE
MOTIVATION IN CoNsTrUTIoNAL LAw

Having stated and illustrated my own views of when and why I
think legislative motivation should be a relevant constitutional
concern, I will conclude this article by contrasting my position
with those of three of the authors who have previously written on
the subject: Professors Ely, Brest, and Eisenberg. In general, I
224. Id at 270 n.21.
225. Id at 267 &n.16.
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think that each of these authors' articles is primarily concerned
with he situation in which a court is asked to say to a legislature
or administrative body, "You have enacted this facially valid law
with the wrong purpose in mind. We know this from your own admission or from circumstantial evidence surrounding the creation
of this particular law. Hence we will hold the law unconstitutional."
By contrast, my concerns with motivation are more general and
go to the situation where a court is asked to say, "You have enacted a law which reasonably appears to us to have been motivated by prejudice. We cannot demonstrate with certainty that
this is so. However, because of the high risk of prejudice in laws
that make classifications like this, we will hold the law unconstitutional because you have not adequately proven that the law is
necessary and that your motives were therefore pure."
Consequently, I differ from the authors discussed below not so
much because I think their views of motivation are wrong, but because I, more than they, am concerned with extending the relevance of motivation in terms of defining the judicial role vis-4-vis
suspect classifications and fundamental rights.
Ely's Theory of Motivation
Professor Ely states, as I also do, that purpose and motivation
both refer to the goals or objectives that legislation is designed to
accomplish. 226 However, he distinguishes the usage of the terms
in a way that seems unnecessarily complicated and ultimately unhelpful.
Ely states that certain laws imposing a burden on an individual
or class-for example, a law requiring certain truck operators to
post security or carry liability insurance but exempting
others 2 2 -create "disadvantageous distinctions" which automatically call for a rational justification in order to be held constitutional.2 28 However, two other kinds of laws do not normally
require rational justifications for the burdens they create. First,
some laws or administrative actions, such as the selection of jurors or the drawing of municipal boundaries, consist of permissible "random choices." Therefore, the inclusion of one person and
226. Ely, supra note 1, at 1217-21.
227. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
228. Ely, supra note 1, at 1223-30.
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the exclusion of another need not be justified by any legitimately
defensible difference between the two individuals but may instead be justified by the randomness of the selection.229 Second,
some laws or administrative actions consist of "discretionary
choices," such as the determination that a school dress code
should prohibit the wearing of long hair by boys or short skirts by
girls. These laws or actions also do not require a legitimately defensible difference in logical terms between the two styles, but
may instead be justified by reference to the discretion of school
administrators to inculcate good taste, or at least conformity, in
students.2 30
The role of "motivation" in Professor Ely's scheme is to require
a legitimately defensible difference in cases of random or discretionary choice where no such defense would normally be required.2 3 ' If it can be demonstrated that a normally random
choice such as the drawing of a municipal boundary line in fact
was not random, but was motivated by a desire to include within
the city people of a given ethnic background or a given political
affiliation while excluding others, then the general justification of
random selection is eliminated. The line-drawing must instead be
justified by showing that the demonstrated motivation in fact
serves some legitimately defensible government goal such as the
affirmance of traditional neighborhood allegiances.2 3 2 The disproportionate impact of a law on some given group merely calls for a
demonstration that random choice was indeed followed; it does
233
not automatically void the law.
229. Id., at 1230-35.
230. Id., at 1235-49.
231. Id., at 1263-66.
232. Brest's reading of Ely differs from mine with respect to the consequences
Ely would attach to showings of unconstitutional motivation. Brest assumes that
in random choice situations, Ely would not consider racially discriminatory decisions to be "suspect"-even if it could be demonstrated that blacks systematically
were being excluded from jury panels-but would only require some "rational" or
"legitimate" defense for such a rule. An Approach, supra note 2, at 135. Ely does
not seem to reach this conclusion. Rather, he seems to conclude that the criterion
of decision must be defended in its own terms so that a racially discriminatory decision such as the exclusion of blacks from juries could be upheld only if some
good justification existed for the practice-which, he states, there practically never
would be. The reason, he states elsewhere, that "suspect" classifications are not
automatically created seems to be that some nonrandom choices would not be
suspect even if they were explicitly stated in the law-for example, the exclusion
of deaf people (not blacks) from juries. His use of the term "legitimate" justification includes both "rational" and "compelling" justifications, each of which may be
called upon depending on the nature of the deprivation or discrimination involved.
Thus, political redistricting which can be shown not to be random but to have
been based on the political makeup of the community may still be justifiable in
terms of some legitimate, perhaps compelling, state interest. Ely, supra note 1, at
1271-72.
233. Ely, supra note 1, at 1254-63.

1026

[voL

15: 953, 1978]

FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Similarly, in discretionary choice situations, if it can be demonstrated that the lawmaker was not motivated merely by a desire
to inculcate good taste in enacting a dress code but instead desired to exclude from school or to burden children of a given religious or ethnic background-such as poor children who could not
afford certain clothing like overcoats, or children from a religious
or ethnic tradition prescribing long hair for boys-then the law
must again be defended in terms of "a rational (at least) connec23 4
tion with some permissible governmental goal."
Professor Ely states that the degree of justification thus required by a showing of improper motivation varies with the context. In random choice situations, the defense of the law's
motivation must be in terms of this motivation. For example, a
nonrandom attempt to exclude minority groups from juries would
be constitutionally suspect and would require justification in
terms of a compelling state interest. An attempt to exclude deaf
persons from juries would presumably not be suspect and would
require only a rational connection with a valid state interest.235 In
discretionary choice situations, the same process of justification
normally applies, with the demonstrated motivation requiring justification as legitimately defensible. However, even if a normally
discretionary dress code requirement (for example, all students
must wear overcoats to school in the winter) can be shown to
have been motivated by an unconstitutional goal (for example,
the exclusion of poor black children from school), Professor Ely
would nonetheless permit the requirement to be sustained if it
could be shown that the requirement was necessary not to some
discretionary goal like "good taste" but to a relatively precise goal
such as the protection of children's health.236
I have difficulty with Professor Ely's analysis, not so much because it leads to wrong results in most cases but because it seems
unnecessarily cumbersome and complicated. First, it seems artificial in terms of both logic and common usage to limit proof of
"motivation" to a demonstration that a choice was neither random
nor properly discretionary. In the first place, it is difficult to speak
of "proving" that a choice was motivated by nonrandom or nondiscretionary goals, which proof then triggers a requirement that
the choice be justified by reference to a valid or compelling state
234. Id, at 1207, 1267-69 (parenthetical original).
235. Id., at 1271 n.190.
236. Id., at 1272-75.
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purpose. In the absence of a confession by the official involved,
motivation normally must be proven by the very lack of any valid
state interest the law serves; indeed, Ely himself recognizes that
"alternative explanations [of legislative or administrative goals]
will often render impossible a responsible inference of illicit motivation."2 37 If no blacks are chosen to serve on a jury panel, no
demonstration of illicit "motivation," as that term is commonly
used, can be made except by showing that this result was neither
fortuitous-that is, the result of random choice-nor necessary to
some valid state interest. In other words, the law is enacted with
improper motivation if its impact is suspect and it is neither random nor logically justified. It seems artificial at best to divide this
inquiry into two parts as Ely does when he states that a showing
that the decision was not random constitutes a showing of "motivation" which then requires a logical justification. 238 Absent such
justification, Ely would presumably state that the law has a bad
"purpose." Yet he states earlier, as I would also do, that motivation and purpose mean the same thing. To distinguish them as he
does-by using motivation to mean proof that a decision was not
random or discretionary, followed by a search for logical justification to test "purpose"-again seems contradictory and artificial.
In short, there does not appear to be a difference in the way
motivation is used or analyzed between Ely's "disadvantageous
distinction" model and situations of random or discretionary
choice. I think that one can properly assert, contrary to Professor
Ely's position and more simply, that all burdens placed by law on
an individual call for some rational justification. In some instances, random selection or discretionary choice constitute
proper justifications for a law, indicating a proper motivation or
purpose. However, if the official admits or circumstantial evidence indicates that the choice was not random or that he did not
pursue proper discretionary goals, these justifications are of
course unavailable. In these cases, some other, "rational," justification for the law must be found, or it will be found to be wrongfully motivated and unconstitutional.2 3 9 In practice, and with a

237. Id., at 1268.
238. Brest also takes the position, contrary to Ely, that judicial usage generally
does not describe as an inquiry into "motivation" either the determination
whether administrators were acting according to a rule (as opposed to a random
or to an ad hoc choice) or the determination of the rule's content. An Approach,
supra note 2, at 111-15.
239. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, even if some other, rational justification does exist, the Court may remand for a new decision if the administrator
admits initially having considered improper factors. See text accompanying notes
250-56 infra.
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few exceptions, 240 the only laws that are likely to be found arbitrary are those the impact of which creates a suspicion of invidious purpose or motivation in the first place, so that arbitrary laws
and laws with an invidious purpose or motivation are essentially
fungible. I do not think that Ely's more complicated theory adds
anything of significance to this rather simple explanation.
A second problem with Ely's theory involves his conclusion that
an admission by a lawmaker that a normally discretionary
choice-for example, the overcoat hypothetical-in fact was made
with a desire to harm a racial minority group need not result in
the invalidation of a law which serves some other valid purpose-for example, student health. I would have to agree with
Professors Brest and Eisenberg, who criticize Professor Ely's position on the grounds that even though the same decision could
subsequently be made with a laundered history, the initial decision was contaminated by an improper consideration. 241
Subsequent to the Brest article, the Supreme Court in dictum
seems to have accepted the Brest position.2 42 In the absence of a
wrongful consideration, the rule might not have been adopted despite the presence of alternative justifications. At the least, the
public deserves the assurance that an instance of state action was
made without demonstrable consideration of impermissible factors. Where such a factor has been admitted, a court could legitimately either void the law for reconsideration by the lawmaker or
go further and require the lawmaker to demonstrate before reenacting the law that student health was adversely affected. The
court might even prevent reenactment of any similar law for a
given period of time as a "cooling off" period. Of course, there
may also be some laws that serve such essential interests that a
court would not feel justified in voiding them even where improper purposes were confessed by the lawmaker. But this conclusion seems properly a matter of judicial discretion rather than
constitutional necessity. In this sense, constitutional adjudication
closely parallels judicial review of a lower court or administrative
agency decision under a statute where the decision rested in part
240. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(holding arbitrary on grounds of substantive due process a zoning requirement
recognizing as a "family" only a few categories of related individuals).
241. An Approach, supra note 2, at 115-18, 134-46.
242. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 n.11, 270 n.21 (1977).
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on evidence that the court or agency should not have considered
relevant. Unless the same result is compelled by the other evidence, so that the wrongfully considered factor constituted only
harmless error, the Court will remand to the court or agency for
consideration based only on permissible factors. The decisionmaker may reach the same conclusion a second time, but the
public and the parties are at least entitled to a decision uninfluenced by such improper concerns.
Brest's Theory of Motivation
Professor Brest has written on motivation twice: first and more
explicitly in connection with Palmer v. Thompson,243 and second
in his Supreme Court Foreword on the "antidiscrimination principle" in connection with Washington v. Davis.244 Additionally, correspondence between Brest and myself in connection with the
present article has helped clarify my own understanding of his
position.245 This correspondence indicates that it would probably
be misleading to describe and criticize Brest's views on motivation as a rigorous "theory" which defines and delimits motivation's relevance; rather, he has dealt with the particular problems
of motivation raised by the two cases just mentioned without necessarily attempting to limit the relevance of motivation to these
areas.
For purposes of Palmer v. Thompson, Brest fences off the problem of motivation at stake by stating that "[i]n general, the courts
have reserved the characterization 'motivation' for the .

.

. in-

quiry to determine whether impermissible criteria or objectives
played a role in the decisionmaking process when the same result
might have been achieved by the consideration of legitimate criteria or justified in terms of legitimate objectives."2 46 In other
words, courts inquire into motivation in order to determine which
of several possible goals or objectives were considered by
lawmakers in adopting a rule, making an ad hoc decision, or deciding which of several rules to apply.
By contrast, Brest takes the position in his Palmer article that a
finding of illicit motivation is not necessary for the requirement
that laws which disadvantage minority groups, for example, must
meet an extraordinary burden of justification: The classification
itself produces this demand. Even so, he does notl that suspicion
243. An Approach, note 2 supra.
244. Brest, note 28 supra.
245. Letter from Paul Brest to Morris Clark (Jan. 3, 1978); Letter from Paul

Brest to Morris Clark (Dec. 22, 1977).
246. An Approach, supra note 2, at 115.
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of an actual illicit motivation does "play an important role in the
Court's decision to hold certain criteria 'suspect.' "247 Brest also
rejects a definition of motivation that would establish whether a
decisionmaker is in fact operating in a systematic or rule-determined fashion instead of randomly or on an ad hoc basis. He thus
disagrees with Ely that analysis of "motivation" determines
whether a "rule" is being followed and what its content is in the
sense of trying, for example, to exclude minority racial groups
from juries, colleges, or municipal boundaries. He simply explains
that courts do not generally use the term "motivation" to describe
this analysis. 248
Again, I do not understand Brest to advance this description of
motivation as a rigorous definition with functional implications,
but rather as a means of stating the particular motivational problem involved in Palmer. Otherwise, I think (and Brest would
probably agree) that the definition would be too limiting. There is
no functional reason for saying that motivation is not involved in
determining whether an "operative rule" is justified or what operative rule if any was being used in a given situation while saying
that motivation is involved only in deciding why a decisionmaker
made a given decision.
An example illustrates the reasons for this last assertion. Assume that a school requires all students to take courses in their
own ethnic histories, in segregated classes. Assume likewise that
no course is offered to Hispanic students, who instead are sent to
study hall. Under Brest's view, motivation would not be a primary
concern in determining whether an explicit rule segregating students for their classes is constitutional because any racial classification is already suspect. His limited description would also
indicate that motivation is not at issue if the racial classification
were not explicit, but students were instead assigned by name to
separate classes, with racial segregation as the result. Rather, the
existence and content of the operative rule would be deduced
from the impact of the assignments and then analyzed as though
the rule had been explicitly stated.
In essence, under Professor Brest's limited description of motivation as set forth above, motivation would be solely relevant to
the question whether the refusal to offer a course to Hispanic stu247. Id&, at 108-09.
248. Id, at 115.
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dents was justified. The school administrators may have determined that no texts were available, that no qualified teachers
were available, that only two Hispanic students attended the
school so that a separate course was not warranted, that there
was no need for Hispanic students to be treated as a separate ethnic group, or that Hispanic students were unpleasant and should
be discriminated against.
In fact-contrary to this limited description of motivation-a
court's analysis in the third situation would be the same as in the
first two: Is the burdensome distinction-no courses for Hispanic
students-justified by some legitimate state interest? If the court
were to decide that any of the administrators' first three explanations were true and valid, it would uphold the law. It would not be
possible, absent a confession by the administrator, to conclude
that the fourth and fifth explanations were the true purpose of
the decision or even contributed to it. In other words, the court
would ask here, as it would of the rule segregating other students
for purposes of the ethnic history course, whether some valid reason existed to support the decision. Only if the officials admit that
they as a body also gave weight to the fourth and fifth considerations could a court properly conclude that the decisionmaker considered an improper factor.
It is my understanding that Professor Brest agrees with this
conclusion and that he does not argue that his limited description
of motivation should have functional implications. Instead, it
should serve to describe and fence off the particular kind of motivational inquiry involved in Palmer. As such, I have no quarrel
with the description, so long as semantic confusion is avoided. Indeed, in his subsequent Supreme Court Foreword on Washington
v. Davis, Brest makes clear that invidious motivation is central to
his view of the "antidiscrimination principle," and is critical (at
least) to problems of race, extending well beyond the kind of
249
motivational problem involved in Palmer.
Professor Brest concludes that whenever the decisionmaker
has taken into account, or given weight to, goals that are constitutionally impermissible, the decision should be voided. Determining whether the goal actually is impermissible involves the same
kind of evaluation that would occur vis-h-vis an explicit racial
classification: "It would be inappropriate to hold that the motivation [to segregate by race] as such invalidated the rule, for even if
the rule explicitly classified by race it would not automatically
fail, but would only trigger the demand for an extraordinary justi249. Brest, supra note 28, at 28-31.
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fication," 250 which may be proffered here as well.

However, I understand Professor Brest to say that once it is determined that a motivation actually was impermissible-for example, if the official involved admits that he or she acted for
conscious reasons of animus-the decision should automatically
be voided. "If the objective is illicit the decision should simply be
invalidated." 251 Elsewhere he states that "[i]f the decisionmaker
gave weight to an illicit objective, the court should presume that
his consideration of the objective determined the outcome of the
decision and should invalidate the decision in the absence of
clear proof to the contrary."252 Professor Brest acknowledges that
a plaintiff will frequently be unable to prove that an illicit objective was considered at all unless the decisionmaker admits it or
unless no valid explanation exists for the action, yet he asserts
that the law should be overturned in those perhaps rare cases
where an illegal objective was considered even if it was not demonstrably held determinative. The decisionmaker thereafter is
generally entitled to reach the same decision again "in identical
form, provided only that it is made for licit reasons." 25 3
In general, I agree with Professor Brest's approach to courts'
remedies. To the extent I disagree, it is because courts might in
some cases uphold a decision, despite an admittedly improper
motivation, on the ground that any other decision clearly would
be impossible in light of the compelling nature of the other justifications. For example, a court probably should not invalidate an
army regulation excluding pregnant women from combat, even if
the official responsible for promulgating the regulation admits
that he thought women should be kept barefoot, pregnant, and
out of the military altogether and also admits that his regulation
was one of the few ways he could legally implement his views.
Such examples are as rare, however, and perhaps as far-fetched,
as the one just offered. Moreover, Professor Brest may well provide for such cases by positing that it can sometimes be demonstrated that an admitted, illicit motivation was not in fact
determinative of the outcome of the decision. The Court in the

250.
251.
252.
253.

An Approach, supra note 2, at 118.
Id., at 131.
Id., at 117.
Id., at 115.
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Arlington Heights case has indicated that it shares this view. 254
With respect to remedies it thus seems, as stated above, that
constitutional law and administrative law are very similar: An administrative decision will be upheld unless it is unjustifiable or
the record clearly establishes that improper factors were considered by the administrative agency, even if the decision is independently justifiable but not compelled.2 5 5 Moreover, proof that
such factors were deemed relevant in administrative cases and in
constitutional cases involving decisions by administrative officials
is usually required to be stronger than that afforded by legislative
56
history.2
Consequently, I would state that any statute or administrative
decision constituting state "action" will be upheld either unless it
serves no valid goals adequate to rebut a presumption, if any, of
improper purpose or motivation resulting from its use of suspect
classifications or its impact on specially protected interests, or
unless the decisionmaker admits consideration of an improper
goal, in which case a court should have discretion either to uphold, reverse, or remand the decision depending on the circumstances. "Motivation" and "purpose" are interchangeable terms,
except that the Court uses "motivation" when it is asked to rely
on evidence of the decisionmaker's own admission that he or she
considered an improper goal or when it is asked to speculate
about the consideration of some improper goal despite the fact
that the law also serves proper goals.
With regard to legislative decisions, the courts rarely will find
evidence of legislators' admissions alone sufficiently persuasive
to hold a statute invalid. Professor Brest himself agrees that
statements by individual legislators or sponsors, even if uncontested, merely "lend some support to an inference of illicit motivation . . . , though alone they would not provide a sufficient
basis for invalidation."25 7 Otherwise, motivation and purpose
mean the same thing and are determined by reference to a statute's effects in light of the suspicions or presumptions about improper motivation or purpose that the Court has established with
regard to distinctions based on race, sex, alienage, or illegitimacy,
254. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270-71 n.21 (1977) (dictum).
255. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 75-98

(1977); K DAVIS, AnMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 646-87 (1976).
256. Brest concurs that legislative history generally does not serve as an adequate basis for holding legislation unconstitutional An Approach, supra note 2, at
117.
257. Id. See also text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.

1034

[voL 15: 953, 19781

Fundamental Rights in ConstitutionalLaw
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

or with regard to burdens on "fundamental rights" such as
speech, press, assembly, religion, travel, or privacy.
Eisenberg'sTheory of Motivation
Like Professor Brest, but perhaps intending a more rigorous
definition, Professor Eisenberg would state that inquiries into
motivation are irrelevant where suspect classifications exist because burdens based on such classifications are unconstitutional
whether the legislature intended to harm or to help the minority
group affected. An example would be the requirement of segregated schooling.258 In the first amendment area, statutes that impose burdens depending on the content of speech are
unconstitutional without reference to motivation, for the same
reason.259 Nor, in Professor Eisenberg's view, is inquiry into motive necessitated where a law fails to bear a rational relationship
to a permissible state purpose. Arbitrary laws are unconstitutional whether or not invidiously motivated. 260 In still other areas
of constitutional law-for example, in those involving procedural
rights to jury trial or to counsel-motivation is irrelevant and the
Court simply looks to the effects or impact of the law to deter261
mine whether a constitutional safeguard has been violated.
This determination is based on processes of definition or balancing rather than on inquiry into motivation.
Professor Eisenberg, like Professor Brest, limits the examination of motive to situations where a law purports to and does
serve certain legitimate purposes and where it does not explicitly
make a suspect classification, but where the legislature may have
had an improper hidden purpose or motive in mind when it
passed the law.262 Eisenberg criticizes Brest, not for his description of the role of motivation, but for his failure to explain the
kinds of constitutional provisions to which motivation is critical
and those to which it is not. 263 Professor Eisenberg posits that improper motivation should serve to invalidate a law not only where
the motivation involves discrimination based on race, but also
where it is based on speech, religion, or association. 264 He uses
258.
259.
260.
261..
262.
263.
264.

Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 99-101.
I&, at 102-03.
Id., at 102.
Id., at 139-46.
Id., at 99-105, 132-46.
Id., at 128-32.
Id, at 134-39.
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the term "rights of equality" to demark those kinds of traits that
the state may not constitutionally use as a basis for discrimination.265 A motive to do so renders a law unconstitutional unless
the state meets the heavy burden of showing that the same result
would have been compelled despite the illicit motive. An example
is the situation in which a black teacher is fired because of race
but would have been fired anyway because of incompetence. 26 6
By contrast, Professor Eisenberg states that motivation is irrelevant to the delineation of constitutional rights in several areas.
One area has to do with motives "relating to the scope of governmental power."267 Motive is irrelevant not only to laws which
abridge procedural rights conferred by the Constitution but also
to laws which exceed other constitutional limits on governmental
power, such as the tenth amendment limit on federal power vis-avis the states, and to rules defining obscenity or establishing time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech. Rather, the Court simply looks to the impact or effect of the statute and compares this
effect with the limit established by the Constitution, apparently
in definitional or balancing terms. Finally, motive is irrelevant to
still other areas of adjudication because no right to equality exists.268 For example, if it could have been shown in Railway Express Agency v. New York 2 6 9 that the city's motive in forbidding
advertising on trucks not owned by the advertiser was solely to
disadvantage nonowner-operated trucks, there would have been
no constitutional violation because this motive was effectively accepted by the Court as valid.270 In other words, there is no right of
equality based on occupation or economic status of this sort. The
distinction between those classifications which are barred by
rights of equality and those which are not is defined not so much
by the lesser rationality of certain classifications such as race or
content of speech but by the historical propensity of lawmakers
to discriminate prejudicially and with animus on the basis of
these traits.2 71
Because Professor Eisenberg's view of motivation is highly similar to Professor Brest's (except for Professor Eisenberg's delineation of the constitutional provisions to which motivation does
and does not bear relevance), my criticisms of the two theories
are largely interchangeable. To the extent that Professor Eisen265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id., at 101.
Id., at 150-51.
Id., at 141-46.
Id., at 146-49.
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 147-48.

271. Id, at 148-49.
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berg purports to adopt as a rigorous definition Professor Brest's
description of the problem of motivation, the problems raised earlier with regard to Professor Brest's limited description become
real and not merely hypothetical. Perhaps these objections are
largely semantic, dealing with the definition of motivation more
than with recommended outcomes. Nonetheless, I see no reason
to say that motivation is irrelevant to a determination that explicit statutory classifications which are suspect are or are not
constitutionally justified by a compelling state interest. Suspect
classifications--or burdens on "rights of equality"--whether
under equal protection or the first amendment are simply those
classifications which are suspected or presumed to be illicitly motivated as a generic matter. There is no essential or conceptual
difference between these generic presumptions of illicit motivation and the more specific presumptions that might result, for example, from the way a given municipal boundary line is drawn,
excluding blacks.272

I also disagree with Professor Eisenberg that motivation as a
definitional matter is irrelevant to arbitrary laws. As a practical
matter, only those laws the language or impact of which gives rise
to a suspicion or presumption of improper motivation will generally be found to lack a rational or compelling connection to a valid
state interest.2 73 Indeed, Professor Eisenberg states as much in

defining "rights of equality." Motivation seems clearly relevant to
this finding of arbitrariness. On the other hand, the ordinance in
the Railway Express case was in fact essentially arbitrary, but
the Court refused to hold it so because the kind of classification
272. Gomillion v. IAghtfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

273. But see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 491 (1977) (plurality opinion) (overturning as arbitrary a zoning law with too narrow a definition of 'family").
The law overturned in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled in City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976), was no exception to the general
statement in text. In Morey, the Court overturned a law giving special privileges
to one named company, American Express. The Court overturned this law not
simply because it was arbitrary-American Express was an especially stable and
reliable concern-but because laws granting special favors to particular companies
are logically suspect not of animus but of unprincipled favoritism or even the graft
powerful companies' well-paid lobbyists can generate. Motivation seems clearly
relevant to this decision. It also comes as no surprise that Dukes, overruling
Morey, involved a legal exemption granted to two individual pushcart operators in
the Vieux Carre section of New Orleans-hardly the sort of beneficiaries who
might have corrupted the legislative process. Had the Court referred sufficiently
to motive, these two decisions could have been reviewed as compatible, not antithetical
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in question was not the sort which gave rise to a presumption that
the legislature had malfunctioned by reason of prejudice or animus.
Finally, Professor Eisenberg's view that motivation is relevant
to first amendment rights, in the sense that burdens keyed to
classifications based on speech, religion, or association are likely
to be motivated by irrational prejudice or animus, concurs with
my view. 274 I think his contribution in this regard is highly useful.
However, I disagree with at least the sharpness of his distinction
between rights of equality, to which motivation is relevant, and
limits on governmental power, to which motivation is irrelevant. It
seems to me that constitutional procedural rights, which he describes as limits on governmental power, exist at least in part because of fear that the government may summarily convict people
it suspects of crimes rather than impartially seek truth in criminal cases. Sixth amendment procedural requirements thus prevent prejudiced judgments against criminal suspects. Similarly,
the tenth amendment has been judicially enforced against the
federal government because of the fear, right or wrong, that Congress will be tempted to aggrandize its own power at the expense
of state governments. It is true to say that the limits placed on
governmental power to restrain these actions with potentially invidious purposes require definition and that definition requires a
balancing of interests and a consideration of impact-but so do
Professor Eisenberg's "rights of equality." For example, the
equality right not to be discriminated against on the basis of one's
speech gives rise to a limitation on governmental power-namely,
that government cannot make penalties depend on the content of
speech unless required by a clear and present danger and unless
the speaker intended to bring this clear and present danger to
pass. This limitation on governmental power requires definition,
balancing, and consideration of impact. What is "speech" as opposed to action or as opposed to areas of "nonspeech" like obscenity? What is a clear and present danger? Does a law limit
itself to intentionally wrongful speech? First amendment rules re-

garding libel, obscenity, and fighting words also illustrate such
limits. These rules were created to prevent wrongfully motivated
laws and require definition and balancing by reference to the

laws' impact.
In sum, I think that Professor Eisenberg is wrong to say that
motivation is irrelevant to limitations on governmental power.
Some procedural requirements do of course apply not only to
274. See Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MAINN. L. REv. 379, 447-49 (1976).
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groups which are traditionally unpopular in society, but to everyone; yet, the thrust of such requirements is nonetheless to prevent biased or incomplete decisionmaking. It is the suspicion of
legislative malfunction or prejudice, in light of history, that gives
rise to judicial enforcement of most constitutional limitations on
governmental power. Defining these limitations intelligently requires reference to the fears of invidious purpose that give rise to
them. Conversely, rights of equality which prohibit laws that
serve invidious ends give rise to specific rules limiting governmental power. Hence, in my view, motivation is not irrelevant to
limits on governmental power; rather, inquiry into motivation and
into the definition of limits is part and parcel of the same process
of constitutional adjudication.
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